No Damages For Assaults While At Work for the DOE

I find the decision of the Second Department in cases where a DOE employee was assaulted by a student to be unjust, arbitrary and capricious. Maybe because I am not an Attorney I am missing something?

If a DOE employee is assaulted by a student, while on the job, the DOE doesnt owe the employee anything. The Appellate Department Second Department says that:

"  while the DOE might owe a special relationship to students no such relationship is owed to teachers and administrators. "

Yikes. No duty of care? See here.
Everyone who works for the Department of Education is on their own if harmed while working?

Betsy Combier
betsy.combier@gmail.com
Editor, NYC Rubber Room Reporter
Editor, Parentadvocates.org
Editor, New York Court Corruption
Editor, National Public Voice
Editor, NYC Public Voice

Can a teacher recover damages from the DOE for injuries sustained from a student assault?

Posted on August 4, 2016

4

No. Betty Brumer, a fourth grade teacher at a public school in Brooklyn, alleges that she was injured when she was assaulted by one of her students. According to the plaintiff, the student had been restrained by a school security guard after engaging in a fight with another boy during a fire drill.

Although the security guard escorted the student away from the  rest of the class, the student subsequently  returned to the  scene and began fighting again. The plaintiff alleges that during this second episode, the student hit her, causing her to fall to the ground and sustain injuries.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, found that while the DOE might owe a special relationship to students no such relationship is owed to teachers and administrators. The Court went further to explain that a special relationship can be formed in three ways: “`(1) when the  municipality violates a statutory  duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes  positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety  violation'”

None of these were present for Ms. Brumer.

BETTY BRUMER, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. 2014­00461, Index No. 32716/09. 132 A.D.3d 795 (2015) 18 N.Y.S.3d 149 2015 NY Slip Op 07611, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department. Decided October 21, 2015.

Betty Brumer, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. (Index No. 32716/09) 2014-00461 SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 132 A.D.3d 795; 18 N.Y.S.3d 149; 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7683; 2015 NY Slip Op 07611 October 21, 2015, Decided CORE TERMS: teacher, special relationship, summary judgment, school district, owe, inter alia, school premises, administrators, municipality, supervising, adults, recover damages, personal injuries, security guard HEADNOTES Schools—Teachers—Assault by Student—Dismissal of Complaint for Failure to Show Special Relationship between School District and Teacher COUNSEL:  [***1] Cronin & Byczek, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Linda M. Cronin of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers, Margaret King, and Keegan K. Staker of counsel), for respondents. JUDGES: L. PRISCILLA HALL, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX, JJ. HALL, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and HINDS-RADIX, JJ., concur. OPINION  [**149]  [*795]  In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Landicino, J.), dated July 5, 2013, which granted that branch of the motion of the defendants City of New York, New York City Department of Education, principal Douglas Avila, and assistant principal Joseph Simione which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Ordered that order is affirmed, with costs.  [**150]  The plaintiff, a fourth grade teacher at a public school in Brooklyn, alleges that she was injured when she was assaulted by one of her students. According to the plaintiff, the student had been restrained by a school security guard after engaging in a fight with another boy during a fire drill. Although the security guard escorted [***2]  the student away from the rest of the [*796]  class, the student subsequently returned to the scene and began fighting again. The plaintiff alleges that during this second episode, the student hit her, causing her to fall to the ground and sustain injuries. The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries. After depositions were conducted, the defendants City of New York, New York City Department of Education, principal Douglas Avila, and assistant principal Joseph Simione (hereinafter collectively the school defendants) moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, contending that there was no special relationship between them and the plaintiff, and, as such, that they did not owe her a duty of care. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the school defendants' motion. A school district may not be held liable for the negligent performance of its governmental function of supervising children in its charge, at least in the absence of a special duty to the person injured (see Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872, 874, 921 NE2d 585, 893 NYS2d 818 [2009]; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d 849, 988 NYS2d 207 [2014]; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d 847, 847-848, 877 NYS2d 400 [2009]; Moreno v City of New York, 27 AD3d 536, 536-537, 813 NYS2d 143 [2006]). Although a school district owes a special duty to its minor students, that duty does not extend to teachers, administrators, [***3]  or other adults on or off school premises (see Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d at 847-848). With regard to teachers, administrators, or other adults on or off school premises, a special relationship with a municipal defendant can be formed in three ways: " '(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation' " (Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 124 AD3d 762, 763, 2 NYS3d 178 [2015], quoting Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186, 199-200, 810 NE2d 393, 778 NYS2d 111 [2004]). Here, as the Supreme Court correctly concluded, the school defendants established, prima facie, that they did not owe the plaintiff a special duty (see Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 124  [*797]  AD3d at 763; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d at 847-848). The plaintiff, in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact in this regard (see Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 124 AD3d at 763; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Moreno v City of New York, 27 AD3d at 536-537). As no special duty existed, we need not consider whether, in supervising the students, the school defendants were performing a discretionary function which would avail them of the governmental immunity defense (see Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69, 75-76, 960 NE2d 356, 936 NYS2d 587 [2011]; Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d at  [**151]  874; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the school defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing [***4]  the complaint insofar as asserted against them (see Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Moreno v City of New York, 27 AD3d at 536-537). Hall, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur. and, Guerrieri v New York City Dept./Bd. of Educ. 2015 NY Slip Op 07816 [132 AD3d 949] October 28, 2015 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2015  Thomas Guerrieri et al., Appellants, v New York City Department/Board of Education, Respondent, et al., Defendants. (And a Third-Party Action.) Gardiner & Nolan, Brooklyn, N.Y. (William Gardiner of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers, Nicholas J. Murgolo, and Damian S. Todola of counsel), for respondent. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta, J.), dated August 16, 2013, which granted the motion of the defendant New York City Department/Board of Education for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. The plaintiff Thomas Guerrieri (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) was employed as a school bus driver by an independent contractor that contracted with the New York City Department/Board of Education (hereinafter the defendant) to provide transportation services to the defendant's students. In 2002 the injured plaintiff allegedly was assaulted by one of the defendant's students while he was transporting that student. The injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action against, among others, the defendant. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and the plaintiffs appeal. "Liability for a claim that a municipality negligently exercised a governmental function 'turns upon the existence of a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public' " (Coleson v City of New York, 24 NY3d 476, 481 [2014], quoting Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58 NY2d 253, 261 [1983]). While a school district owes a special duty to its students to adequately supervise them to prevent foreseeable injuries to fellow students, that duty does not extend to adults (see Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d 849, 850 [2014]; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d 847 [2009]). Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that it did not owe the injured plaintiff a special duty (see Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d at 847; Goga v Binghamton City School Dist., 302 AD2d 650, 651 [2003]; Reynolds v Central Islip Union Free School Dist., 300 AD2d 292, 293 [2002]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Dickerson, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2013 NY Slip Op 32097(U).] ZELINDA ANTOINETTE DINARDO, Respondent, v CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant, THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant. No. 158 COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 13 N.Y.3d 872; 921 N.E.2d 585; 893 N.Y.S.2d 818; 2009 N.Y. LEXIS 4144; 2009 NY Slip Op 8853 October 15, 2009, Argued  December 1, 2009, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered December 23, 2008. The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, (1) affirmed an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Norma Ruiz, J.), which, after a jury trial, had dismissed the action against defendant City of New York (it having been voluntarily discontinued by plaintiff during trial) and awarded plaintiff damages against defendant Board of Education in the amount of $ 512,465, and (2) dismissed an appeal from the original judgment of that court, as superseded by the appeal from the amended judgment.  Dinardo v. City of New York, 57 AD3d 373, 871 NYS2d 15, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't, 2008), reversed.  DISPOSITION: Order reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed, in a memorandum. CORE TERMS: special relationship, discretionary, municipality, assurance, supervisor, classroom, matter of law, injured party's, special relationship, justifiable reliance, ministerial, municipal, discretionary acts, justifiably relied, false sense of security, happening, ongoing, induced, teacher, hang, duty to act, immunity rule, tort liability, entitled to judgment, government action, police officer, police protection, reasoned judgment, vigilance, favorable HEADNOTES Municipal Corporations -- Tort Liability Defendant Board of Education was entitled to judgment as a matter of law in an action by plaintiff teacher who was injured when she tried to restrain a student, who had been verbally and physically aggressive for several months, from attacking another. In negligence cases premised on a special relationship between a municipality and a plaintiff, the injured party's reliance is critical as is the municipality's voluntary affirmative understanding of a duty to act. There was no rational process by which the jury could have reached a finding that plaintiff justifiably relied on assurances by the Board. Vaguely worded statements by plaintiff's supervisor and principal that "something" was being done to have the student removed, without any indication of when, or if, such relief would come, did not, as a matter of law, constitute an action that would lull a plaintiff into a false sense of security or otherwise generate justifiable reliance. Plaintiff was aware that the administrative process for determining whether a student should transfer to a different program or school could take up to 60 days and was still ongoing when the incident occurred. COUNSEL: Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Marta Ross and Edward F.X. Hart of counsel), for appellant. Clark, Gagliardi & Miller, P.C., White Plains (Henry G. Miller and John S. Rand of counsel), for respondent. JUDGES: Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur. Chief Judge Lippman concurs in result in an opinion. Judge Ciparick concurs in result. OPINION  [**586]   [***819]   [*873] MEMORANDUM. The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the complaint dismissed. Plaintiff Zelinda Dinardo, a special education teacher at a New York City public school, was injured when she tried to restrain one student from attacking another. The student had been verbally and physically aggressive for several months, and plaintiff had repeatedly expressed concerns to her supervisors about her safety in the classroom. The school's supervisor of special education and the principal had both told her that "things were being worked on, things were happening" and urged her to "hang in there because something was being done" to have the student removed. Following her injury, plaintiff commenced this action alleging, among other things, that by these assurances the Board of Education of the City of New York had assumed an affirmative duty to take action with respect to the removal of the student and that she justifiably relied upon those assurances. When the student was not removed in a timely fashion, plaintiff alleges, the altercation which led to her injury resulted. At trial, at the close of plaintiff's proof, the Board of Education moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401. Following a jury verdict in Dinardo's favor, the Board of Education moved to set aside the verdict under CPLR 4404 (a).  [*874]  Supreme Court denied both motions. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Dinardo damages. Two Justices dissented on a question of law, and the Board of Education appeals as of right under CPLR 5601 (a). The Board of Education now argues that the conduct alleged to have constituted a promise to act on her behalf was discretionary government action, which cannot be a basis for liability (see McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 202-203, 905 NE2d 1167, 878 NYS2d 238 [2009]; Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40-41, 459 NE2d 182, 471 NYS2d 73 [1983]). We have no occasion to decide that question because, even assuming the school officials' actions in this case were ministerial, there is no rational process by which a jury could have found liability. [***820]   [**587]  In negligence cases premised on a special relationship between municipality and plaintiff, "the injured party's reliance is as critical . . . as is the municipality's voluntary affirmative undertaking of a duty to act. . . . Indeed, at the heart of most of these 'special duty' cases is the unfairness that the courts have perceived in precluding recovery when a municipality's voluntary undertaking has lulled the injured party into a false sense of security and has thereby induced [her] either to relax [her] own vigilance or to forego other available avenues of protection" (Cuffy v New York, 69 NY2d 255, 261, 505 NE2d 937, 513 NYS2d 372 [1987]). The assurance by the municipal defendant must be definite enough to generate justifiable reliance by the plaintiff. Affording Dinardo every inference that may properly be drawn from the evidence presented and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to her (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556, 686 NE2d 1346, 664 NYS2d 252 [1997]), we conclude that there is no rational process by which the jury could have reached a finding that plaintiff justifiably relied on assurances by the Board of Education. The vaguely worded statements by Dinardo's supervisor and principal that "something" was being done to have the student removed, without any indication of when, or if, such relief would come, do not, as a matter of law, constitute an action that would lull a plaintiff into a false sense of security or otherwise generate justifiable reliance. Indeed, plaintiff was aware that the administrative process for determining whether a student should transfer to a different program or school could take up to 60 days and was still ongoing when the incident occurred. There was therefore no "special relationship" between  [*875]  the Board of Education and plaintiff (see Cuffy, 69 NY2d at 259), upon which a cause of action for negligence could be based, and the Board of Education is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CONCUR BY: LIPPMAN CONCUR Chief Judge LIPPMAN. (concurring). I disagree with the majority's conclusion that a rational jury could not have found that a special relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant Board. For several months prior to the incident giving rise to this action, the student exhibited increasing behavioral problems, including bringing a knife to school, which resulted in a week's suspension. Concerned about the student's behavior and the classroom safety risks it presented, plaintiff and her supervisor submitted to the Board's Committee on Special Education a written recommendation to remove the student from plaintiff's classroom and place him in a learning environment better equipped to his highly problematic conduct. The recommendation was supported by notes that plaintiff had kept regarding the student's behavior. These notes disclose that the subject student frequently punched, kicked and threw various items at his classmates. He also threatened to kill plaintiff, another teacher, and his fellow classmates on numerous occasions. While the transfer request was pending, plaintiff repeatedly told her supervisors that she was concerned about the safety of her classroom and "didn't know how much longer [she could] hang in there." She testified, "it was getting more and more impossible to conduct the class . . . I wanted to quit. I couldn't go on anymore . . . It was getting unsafe, and I was concerned about safety in the classroom, and . . . I did not want to return." In response, her supervisors told her to "hang in there"  [***821]   [**588]  because "something was being done" and "things were happening." Viewing the evidence, as we must at this juncture, in the light most favorable to plaintiff (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556, 686 NE2d 1346, 664 NYS2d 252 [1997]), I think the jury could have rationally concluded that a special relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant Board. Although the transfer request was still outstanding when plaintiff was injured, the supervisors' repeated assurances that "things were happening" and "something was being done" suggested an impending solution to the dangerous situation. It would not be unreasonable for the jury to infer that plaintiff, in justifiable reliance on these assurances, chose to remain in the classroom and continue teaching rather than quitting as she had threatened. It should be stressed that the  [*876]  stark choice facing plaintiff was whether she should resign and abandon her class or continue to teach in a situation which was by any reasonable measure dangerous. In electing to follow the latter, socially desirable course, plaintiff relied upon the municipality's assurances that the situation would soon be rectified. Indeed, the evidence, properly viewed, practically compels the conclusion that the assurances made to plaintiff induced her to "relax [her] own vigilance or . . . forego other available avenues of protection" (Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 261, 505 NE2d 937, 513 NYS2d 372 [1987]), and thus sufficed to establish the special relationship upon which recovery is conditioned. Nevertheless, I concur in the majority's result on constraint of McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194, 905 NE2d 1167, 878 NYS2d 238 [2009]). In McLean, this Court held that government action, if discretionary, may never form the basis for tort liability, even if a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the municipality. According to McLean, the special relationship exception only applies where the challenged municipal action is ministerial (see id. at 203). In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Tango v Tulevech (61 NY2d 34, 40, 459 NE2d 182, 471 NYS2d 73 [1983]) and Lauer v City of New York (95 NY2d 95, 99-100, 733 NE2d 184, 711 NYS2d 112 [2000]). But, in those cases, the Court never expressly considered whether the special relationship exception applied to discretionary governmental acts. Even if Tango and Lauer can arguably be read to imply that the special relationship exception does not apply to discretionary acts, that interpretation was flatly rejected in Pelaez v Seide (2 NY3d 186, 810 NE2d 393, 778 NYS2d 111 [2004]), decided after Tango and Lauer, but prior to McLean. In Pelaez, this Court explicitly held that a "narrow exception" to the general discretionary immunity rule exists when a plaintiff establishes a special relationship with the municipality (2 NY3d at 193). One year later, in Kovit v Estate of Hallums, we recognized that the police officer was exercising his discretion and that in order "[t]o hold the City liable for the negligent performance of a discretionary act, a plaintiff must establish a special relationship with the municipality" (4 NY3d 499, 506, 829 NE2d 1188, 797 NYS2d 20 [2005]). I can discern no convincing rationale for the Court's disregard of this relevant binding precedent, which so unreasonably narrows--indeed effectively eliminates--the special relationship exception. Although I agree that liability should not generally attach when a municipal employee is exercising his or her reasoned judgment, the broad immunity recognized for discretionary acts should not extend to situations where a special relationship is  [*877]   [***822]   [**589] present. The touchstone of the special duty rule is that the government, by its undertaking to the specific plaintiff, has gone above and beyond the general duty it owes to the public and created a unique relationship with that plaintiff, upon which he or she is entitled to rely. This is entirely consistent with the general tort principle that a defendant should be held liable for the breach of a duty it voluntarily assumed (see Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co., 247 NY 160, 167, 159 NE 896 [1928]). Whether the municipality's act is characterized as ministerial or discretionary should not be, and never has been, determinative in special duty cases. Indeed, in Cuffy, a seminal case in the special duty context, the plaintiffs alleged that the police had a special duty to protect them based on a police officer's promise that an arrest would be made or some other protective action would be taken regarding an ongoing dispute between plaintiffs and their neighbors (69 NY2d at 259). Although noting that the provision of police protection is within the reasoned judgment of officials and therefore necessarily discretionary in nature, we recognized that an exception to the discretionary immunity rule exists when a special relationship exists between the municipality and plaintiff (see id. at 260; see also Kircher v City of Jamestown, 74 NY2d 251, 255-256, 543 NE2d 443, 544 NYS2d 995 [1989]; De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 305, 457 NE2d 717, 469 NYS2d 611 [1983]). Unfortunately, under the rule announced in McLean, a plaintiff will never be able to recover for the failure to provide adequate police protection, even when the police voluntarily and affirmatively promised to act on that specific plaintiff's behalf and he or she justifiably relied on that promise to his or her detriment. This is particularly disturbing given our recognition that the "police cases . . . all but occupy the special relationship field" (Pelaez, 2 NY3d at 205). The rule in McLean, which clearly extends beyond police protection and applies to all discretionary governmental actions, allows public officials to unjustifiably hide behind the shield of discretionary immunity even when their actions have induced a plaintiff to change his or her behavior in the face of a known threat. Because almost any governmental act may be characterized as discretionary (see Tango, 61 NY2d at 41, citing Prosser, Torts § 132, at 990 [4th ed]), McLean too broadly insulates government agencies from being held accountable to injured parties. The determination here as to whether and when to transfer a potentially dangerous student is undoubtedly within the discretion of the Board and thus may not subject the Board to  [*878]  liability given the recent holding in McLean. Accordingly, I reluctantly concur with the majority that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the complaint dismissed. Judges GRAFFEO, READ, SMITH, PIGOTT and JONES concur in memorandum; Chief Judge LIPPMAN concurs in result in an opinion; Judge CIPARICK concurs in result, stating: The majority does not decide whether this is ministerial or discretionary. I think it was discretionary and therefore, under our recent decision in McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194, 905 NE2d 1167, 878 NYS2d 238 [2009]), must concur, but if I were to go to the issue of special relationship, as the majority does, I would  [***823]   [**590]  disagree for the reasons stated in the concurrence of the Chief Judge. Order reversed, etc. 60 N.Y.2d 861 (1983) Peter Vitale, Respondent, v. City of New York et al., Appellants. Court of Appeals of the State of New York. Argued October 17, 1983. Decided November 22, 1983. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel (Michael Gage and Leonard Koerner of counsel), for appellants. Anthony J. Pirrotti for respondent. Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JASEN, JONES, WACHTLER, MEYER, SIMONS and KAYE concur in memorandum. 862*862MEMORANDUM. The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the action dismissed. Plaintiff, an industrial arts teacher at a junior high school, was injured when he was assaulted by one of the students as he sought to break up an altercation in the hallway of the school. Asserted liability of the city was predicated on evidence of unjustified failure fully to have observed a detailed security plan promulgated by the board of education pursuant to section 2801 of the Education Law.[*] This plan was designed to maintain public order on 863*863 school property, and among its beneficiaries were students, teachers, staff members, visitors and other licensees and invitees alike. Plaintiff recognizes, as he must, that absent a special duty owed to him liability for his injuries may not be imposed on the city for its breach of a duty owed generally to persons in the school system and members of the public (Glick v City of New York, 53 AD2d 528, affd 42 N.Y.2d 831; Bass v City of New York, 38 AD2d 407, affd 32 N.Y.2d 894; Riss v City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579). It is his contention, however, that a special relationship was created between him and the board of education when the security plan was adopted and that the board breached its special duty of care to him when it failed to enforce its own security rules. He grounds his assertion of special duty, and seeks to distinguish the holding in the Glick case, on the circumstance that as a teacher he was himself an integral component of that plan. Nothing in the adoption or content of the plan warrants a finding that it was designed or intended specially for his benefit or that of other teachers in the school. They stood as its beneficiaries in exactly the same position as students, other personnel in the school system, and members of the public who came on the school property. We reject his contention that because the teachers had a role to play in the implementation of the plan they were somehow thereby converted into its special beneficiaries. Indeed other than reciting the bare fact that as a teacher plaintiff had responsibilities for implementation of the plan, he advances no rationale as to why that fact without more should give rise to the special duty which is a condition precedent to governmental liability. Order reversed, etc. [*] That section provides: "Regulation by boards of education of conduct on school district property "1. The board of education, as defined in section two of this chapter, of every school district, however created, within the state shall adopt rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order on school property and shall provide a program for the enforcement thereof. Such rules and regulations shall govern the conduct of students, teachers and other staff as well as visitors and other licensees and invitees. The penalties for violations of such rules and regulations shall be clearly set forth therein and shall include provisions for the ejection of a violator from the school property and in the case of a student or teacher, his suspension, expulsion or other appropriate disciplinary actions. Such rules and regulations shall be filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ninety days after the effective date of this act. All amendments to such rules and regulations shall be filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ten days after their adoption. "2. If the board of education fails to file the rules and regulations within the time required by this section such school district may not be eligible to receive any state aid or assistance until such rules and regulations are duly filed. "3. Nothing contained in this section is intended nor shall it be construed to limit or restrict the freedom of speech nor peaceful assembly."