Thank you, students of MCSM for contacting me!
Betsy Combier
betsy.combier@gmail.com
Editor, NYC Rubber Room Reporter
Editor, Parentadvocates.org
Editor, New York Court Corruption
Editor, National Public Voice
Editor, NYC Public Voice
Editor, Inside 3020-a Teacher Trials
Michael P. Thomas' Amended Complaint
Michael P. Thomas' Complaint:
Michael P. Thomas' Complaint:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________________X
MICHAEL P. THOMAS, :
Plaintiff, 14-cv-8019 (JMF)
-v- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants. :
_________________________________________X
JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District
Judge:
This is the second case brought by Michael P. Thomas, a former
public school teacher proceeding pro
se, against the administration of
the school where he was formerly employed.1 In this case, Thomas alleges
principally that administrators violated his First Amendment rights by preventing him from
distributing information about his blog to students. Thomas also seeks to
pursue a claim of malicious
prosecution in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint (the
“Complaint”) in its entirety. For the reasons explained below, that motion is
largely denied, and Plaintiffs request to amend his Complaint to add a
malicious prosecution claim is granted. In the first case, Thomas alleged that
the Special Commissioner of Investigations for the New York City School
District violated his due process rights by inadequately investigating his
claims that the administration had retaliated against him in violation of New
York law. The Court dismissed the case on July 10, 2015. (No. 14-CV-8554,
Docket No. 21).
Defendants also request a stay of discovery pending the Court’s
resolution of the motion to dismiss. (Mem. Law Supp. Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Am.
Compl. (Docket No. 35) (“Defs.’ Mem.”) 13-14). That request is denied as moot,
as the Court has not yet even entered a discovery schedule.
Generally, in considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
courts are limited to the facts alleged in the complaint and are required to
accept those facts as true. See,
e.g., LaFaro v. N.Y.
Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570
F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). A court may, however, consider documents attached
to the complaint, statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, public records, and
documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about, and relied upon,
in bringing the suit. See, e.g.,
Kleinman v. Elan Corp., 706 F.3d
145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013); Chambers
v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d
147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying rule to district courts). In addition,
because a pro se plaintiffs allegations must be
construed liberally, it is appropriate for a court to consider factual allegations
made in a pro se plaintiffs opposition memorandum, as
long as the allegations are consistent with the complaint. See, e.g., Braxton v. Nichols, No. 08-CV-8568 (PGG), 2010 WL 1010001,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010); cf.
Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192,
195 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering a pro se plaintiffs affidavit in opposition to
a motion to dismiss in addition to the complaint). Accordingly, the following
facts are taken from the Complaint, exhibits attached thereto, Plaintiffs
opposition papers (to the extent they are consistent with the Complaint), and
documents of which the Court may take judicial notice.
Plaintiff was employed by the New York City Department of
Education as a mathematics teacher at the Manhattan Center for Science and
Mathematics (“MCSM”) from September 1989 through July 2012, when he retired.
(Am. Compl. (Docket No. 33) ^ 5). A few months after his retirement, Plaintiff
created a blog criticizing the administration of MCSM. (Id. ^
11). In January 2013, he was distributing business cards with information about
the blog to MCSM students, when he was approached by Defendants Daniel Albetta,
the school’s assistant principal of security; Brian Bradley, the assistant
principal of special education; and Dennis Hernandez, who was performing the
duties of the school’s dean of students. (Id. ^ 7-9, 12-13). Although Plaintiff
attempted to distance himself from them, Albetta, Bradley, and Hernandez
followed him and prevented him from interacting with students. (Id. ^
16). Plaintiff was then approached by Defendant David Jimenez (together with
Albetta, Bradley, and Hernandez, “Defendants”). (Id.
^ 18). Jimenez extended his arm “as if to shake hands,” but then
grabbed Plaintiff’s hand, “threw himself to the ground,” and claimed that
Plaintiff had assaulted him. (Id. ^ 19). When Plaintiff attempted to
walk away, Albetta called 911, and Plaintiff was arrested. (Id. ^
20-21).
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with assault in the third
degree (although the charge was later reduced to attempted assault in the third
degree) and harassment in the second degree, and was placed in a holding cell
pending arraignment. (Id. ^ 21, 23). After his arraignment,
Plaintiff was released on his own recognizance, but the court issued an order
of protection prohibiting Plaintiff from having any contact with Jimenez. (Id. ^
24). Upon the advice of counsel, Plaintiff took down his blog. (Id. ^
25, 33). Plaintiff went to trial in September 2013. (Id. ^
27). At trial, Defendants testified that students had reported that a man was
handing out flyers near the school and harassing students. (Id. ^
28). They further testified that they had a duty to ensure the safety of
students along a route frequently used by students to get to MCSM, which they
called the “safe corridor.” (Id. ^ 29). Plaintiff was found guilty of
harassment in the second degree, but acquitted of the assault charge. (Id. ^
35). As a result of the harassment conviction, the order of protection against
Plaintiff was continued — and expanded to prohibit Plaintiff from entering the
“safe corridor.” (Id. ^ 30).
Plaintiff filed this action on October 6, 2014, alleging that
Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by preventing him from informing
students about his blog and by filing false charges against him, which led him
to remove the blog from the Internet. (Docket No. 1). Although such a claim is
not stated explicitly in the Complaint, Plaintiff also believes that
Defendants’ actions constituted malicious prosecution. (Docket No. 39).
Defendants counter that the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has
not adequately alleged that they were acting under color of state law and
because Plaintiff may not bring claims that imply the invalidity of his
harassment conviction. They further argue that the Court should neither
consider Plaintiff’s newly raised malicious prosecution claim nor grant him
leave to amend the Complaint. The Court will address each argument in turn.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a
court must accept all facts set forth in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Burch v. Pioneer Credit
Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124
(2d Cir. 2008). A claim will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, only if
the plaintiff alleges facts sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” BellAtl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A plaintiff must
show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., and
cannot rely on mere “labels or conclusions” to support a claim, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the plaintiffs
pleadings “have not nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at
570. Here, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro
se, his Complaint “must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a pro
se litigant must still state a
plausible claim for relief. See,
e.g., Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d
119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013). In other words, the Court’s “‘duty to liberally
construe a plaintiffs complaint is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write
it.’” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med.
Coll., 663 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b], at 12-61).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges two First Amendment claims against
Defendants, one for preventing him from distributing information about his blog
to students and one for causing criminal charges to be filed against him, which
resulted in the protective order, which, in turn, led him to take down his
blog. (Am. Compl. ^ 34-35). Plaintiff would have a hard time maintaining the
latter claim, as he voluntarily took the blog down based on the advice of his
own criminal counsel and does not allege that he was required to do so by the
order of protection. (Id. ^ 24-25). But, as Plaintiff himself
acknowledges, the claim suffers from a more fundamental problem: Insofar as it
is premised on the order of protection, and the order of protection was
continued as a result of his conviction for harassment, the claim depends on
the invalidity of his criminal conviction and sentence. (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n
Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. (Docket No. 39) (“Pl.’s Mem.”) 1, 16-17). It
follows that Plaintiff cannot pursue the claim unless and until his conviction
is vacated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994) (holding
that a plaintiff may not bring an action pursuant to Section 1983 that
“necessarily require[s] the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his
conviction”); Poventudv. City of
N.Y., 750 F.3d 121, 129-30 (2d
Cir. 2014) (similar). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted on
consent as to that claim.
There is no basis, however, to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendants violated the First Amendment by preventing him from distributing
information concerning his blog. Defendants argue that the claim must be
dismissed because they were not acting “under color of state law,” as required
for them to be held liable under Section 1983. See, e.g., Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994). More
specifically, Defendants argue that when they confronted Plaintiff they were
acting as private citizens because they “had no power or authority under state
law to prevent Plaintiff from handing out his cards.” (Defs.’ Mem. 6-9). It is
well established, however, that where a defendant “uses his state authority to
violate the plaintiff’s rights, he may be said to act under color of state law
even though he acts contrary to law.” Rodriguez
v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No.
06-CV-13762 (RJS), 2009 WL 3817298, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2009) (citing
cases). Thus, to satisfy the state-action requirement, Plaintiff need not
allege that Defendants had actual authority to prevent him from handing out
business cards to students; he need allege only that Defendants “purport[ed] to act according to official power.” Emanuele v. Town of Greenville, 143 F. Supp. 2d 325, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (emphasis added); see also
Pitchell, 13 F.3d at 548 (stating
that an off-duty police officer could be found liable if he invoked the
“apparent authority” of the police department); Dean v. City of Buffalo, 579 F. Supp. 2d 391, 404 (W.D.N.Y.
2008) (“A person may also be found to act under color of law when he acts under
pretense of law.”). Construed liberally, the Complaint does just that, as it
alleges that Defendants testified at Plaintiff’s trial that they approached him
pursuant to their duty as school officials to maintain the safe corridor. (Am.
Compl. ^ 29). In other words, the Complaint alleges that Defendants claimed to
have authority, by virtue of their positions at MCSM, to prohibit Plaintiff
from interacting with students at that location. That is sufficient at this
stage.
B. Malicious Prosecution
Next, the Court turns to Plaintiffs request for leave to amend his
Complaint to add a claim of malicious prosecution. (Pl.’s Mem. 11-16 &
n.2). Defendants’ sole objection is that such an amendment would be futile.
(Reply Mem. Law Supp. Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. (Docket No. 44)
(“Defs.’ Reply”) 6-9). To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff
must prove: “(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding
against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; (3)
lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as
a motivation for defendant’s actions.” Manganiello
v. City of N.Y., 612 F.3d 149,
171 (2d Cir. 2010). Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
second prong — termination of the proceeding in his favor — because he was
convicted of harassment. (Defs.’ Reply 7-9). But Plaintiff was acquitted of
assault, and the Second Circuit has recognized that “[a] plaintiff charged with
crimes of varying degrees of seriousness, and convicted on the lesser charges,
may nonetheless sue for malicious prosecution on the more serious claims that
were terminated in his favor.” Green
v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52, 59-60
(2d Cir. 2000). The question, then, is whether the assault charge was “so
closely intertwined with the offense of conviction” — that is, the harassment
charge — “that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the acquittal is
sufficiently distinct to support a claim of malicious prosecution.” Fernandez v. City of N.Y., No. 02-CV-8195 (JGK), 2003 WL
21756140, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003). To determine whether two charges are
sufficiently distinct, a court must examine each charge separately, keeping in
mind that “[c]harges may be sufficiently
Although Plaintiff concedes that the Complaint does not
“explicitly” include a malicious prosecution claim (Pl.’s Mem. 11 n.2), he
appears to ask the Court to read such a claim into his Complaint on the ground
that the facts alleged would support one. It is not clear, however, that the
Complaint, as currently drafted, would support a malicious prosecution claim.
In any event, in the Court’s view, the better course is to treat Plaintiff’s
request as one for leave to amend.
distinct even if they arose out of the same events occurring on
the same occasion.” Reid v. City
of N.Y. No. 00-CV-5164 (RCC)
(JCF), 2004 WL 626228, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004).
Here, Plaintiff may have difficulty alleging — let alone proving —
that the assault charge was sufficiently distinct from the harassment charge to
pursue a claim of malicious prosecution. See,
e.g., Fernandez, 2003 WL
21756140, at *6-7 (finding that a plaintiff who was acquitted of assault and
convicted of harassment had not alleged that the charges were sufficiently
distinct to pursue a claim of malicious prosecution). But the Court cannot
reach that conclusion as a matter of law, particularly without giving Plaintiff
an opportunity to amend his Complaint to include any and all relevant facts.
Plaintiff could allege, for example, that he was convicted of harassment based
on his conduct toward Albetta, Bradley, and Hernandez, while the assault charge
was based on his supposed throwing of Jimenez to the ground. Alternatively,
Plaintiff could allege facts to support a conclusion that the factfinder at his
criminal trial found him guilty of harassing Jimenez (instead of, or in
addition to, the other Defendants), but also found that Jimenez had staged the
supposed assault. In either case, the allegations might be sufficient to show
that Plaintiff received a “termination in his favor” on the assault charge,
notwithstanding his conviction for harassment. Cf. Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that a probable cause finding supporting disorderly conduct charges
did not preclude the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim for resisting
arrest or assault because, otherwise, “an officer with probable cause as to a
lesser offense could tack on more serious, unfounded charges which would
support a high bail or a lengthy detention, knowing that the probable cause on
the lesser offense would insulate him from liability for malicious prosecution
on the other offenses”). In any event, mindful that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court concludes that the
more appropriate, and prudent, course is to allow him to amend his Complaint.4
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
granted on consent as to Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated his First
Amendment rights in causing criminal charges to be filed against him, but is
otherwise denied. Further, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint to
add a claim for malicious prosecution. Any such Second Amended Complaint shall
be filed within 30 days of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Plaintiff is reminded that any Second Amended Complaint would replace, not
supplement, the current Complaint, and advised that he should include any and
all facts that may be relevant to his malicious prosecution claim, as it is
unlikely that he would be given an additional opportunity to amend in the event
that Defendants move to dismiss on the same ground that they oppose leave to
amend here.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Docket No. 34 and to
mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Date: September 1, 2015
Defendants appear to suggest that allowing Plaintiff to pursue a malicious prosecution claim based on the assault charge would imply the invalidity of his harassment conviction (Defs.’ Reply 9), but that argument borders on frivolous. As noted above, the malicious prosecution claim can go forward only if the acquittal on the assault charge constitutes a termination in Plaintiff’s favor despite his (unchallenged) conviction on the other charge.
Defendants appear to suggest that allowing Plaintiff to pursue a malicious prosecution claim based on the assault charge would imply the invalidity of his harassment conviction (Defs.’ Reply 9), but that argument borders on frivolous. As noted above, the malicious prosecution claim can go forward only if the acquittal on the assault charge constitutes a termination in Plaintiff’s favor despite his (unchallenged) conviction on the other charge.
More on malicious prosecution and probable cause:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
- No. 10-4955-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2011)
SELINGER V. CITY OF NEW YORK
We have
considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE
COURT: CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
PRESENT:
GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
Circuit Judges.
APPEARING FOR APPELLANTS:
SCOTT A. KORENBAUM, Esq. (Frederick K. Brewington, Esq.,
SCOTT A. KORENBAUM, Esq. (Frederick K. Brewington, Esq.,
on the brief), New York, New York.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEES:
ANDREW S. WELLIN, Of Counsel (Larry A. Sonnenshein, Of Counsel,
ANDREW S. WELLIN, Of Counsel (Larry A. Sonnenshein, Of Counsel,
on the brief), for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation
Counsel of the
City of New York, New York, New York.
Appeal
from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (Richard M. Berman, Judge).
UPON
DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
judgment entered on November 8, 2010, is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiffs
Paul Selinger and Marsha Selinger appeal an award of summary judgment in favor
of defendant Detective William Greene on claims of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 , and the dismissal of related state law claims for lack
of jurisdiction. We review an award of summary judgment de novo, see
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d
93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010), "constru[ing] the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, [and] drawing all reasonable inferences and
resolving all ambiguities in [his] favor," Schiano v. Quality Payroll
Sys., Inc., 445
F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
assume familiarity with the underlying facts and record of prior proceedings,
which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
1. Malicious
Prosecution
Because
Marsha Selinger's claims are derivative of her husband's, we hereafter refer
only to Paul Selinger's claims in discussing plaintiffs' appeal. Further,
because plaintiffs do not appeal the award of summary judgment in favor of
defendant the City of New York, we do not discuss that award further.
Selinger
contends that he adduced sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on the
question of whether Greene lacked probable cause to initiate Selinger's
prosecution for insurance fraud. See Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149,
160-61 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that § 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution is assessed by reference to elements of related state tort, which,
under New York law, requires proof of absence of probable cause). That claim
fails for several reasons. First, because Selinger was prosecuted on an
indictment, Greene is entitled to a presumption of probable cause, which may be
rebutted only "by evidence that the indictment was procured by fraud,
perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad
faith." Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs have failed to introduce evidence of any such misconduct.
Second,
even without the benefit of a presumption, there is no genuine issue as to the
existence of probable cause to initiate the challenged prosecution. While
probable cause requires more than "mere suspicion" of wrongdoing, Mallory
v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,
454 (1957), its focus is on "probabilities," not "hard
certainties," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It does not equate to a prima facie or
preponderance showing. See id. at 235; Spinelli v. United
States, 393
U.S. 410, 419 (1969). Nor does it demand a showing that a good faith
belief be "correct or more likely true than false." Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 742 (1983). It requires only such facts as make wrongdoing
probable. See Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 157 (2d
Cir. 2007).
Such
probability was established as a matter of law in this case from evidence
showing that, before referring Selinger to the district attorney's office for
prosecution, Greene had adduced evidence that the health clinic with which
Selinger was associated had submitted fraudulent insurance claims on behalf of
"Igor Gabjilov," an undercover police officer whom Selinger diagnosed
with temporomandibular joint ("TMJ") disorder. Those claims sought
reimbursements for medical treatments that Gabjilov purportedly received but
that, in fact, were never provided. On at least one of these fraudulent claim
forms, Paul Selinger's stamped signature appeared on the "signature of
provider" line.
Plaintiffs
assert that the record would permit a finding that Selinger legitimately
diagnosed the undercover officer as suffering from TMJ disorder. But the
validity of Selinger's medical diagnosis is irrelevant. As plaintiffs
recognize, "[t]he essence of the insurance fraud scheme . . . was
fraudulent billing," Le., insurance claims filed for medical treatments
that were never performed. Pl.'s Br. 44. On this point, Greene undoubtedly had
evidence of probable wrongdoing by Selinger: a fraudulent reimbursement claim
bearing Selinger's stamped signature as the provider of services never
performed. That document constituted "reasonably trustworthy information
as to . . . facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief than an offense has been . . . committed by the
person to be arrested." Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d
at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In
urging otherwise, Selinger observes that Greene did not know whether Selinger
actually stamped the form or was otherwise involved in submitting the insurance
bills. But Selinger adduced no evidence suggesting that Greene had reason
to question Selinger's signature on the claims form. See id. (recognizing
that "failure to make a further inquiry when a reasonable person would
have done so may be evidence of lack of probable cause" (internal
quotation marks omitted)). "[T]he fact that an innocent explanation may be
consistent with the facts alleged . . . does not negate probable cause, . . .
and an officer's failure to investigate an arrestee's protestations of
innocence generally does not vitiate probable cause." Panetta v.
Crowley, 460
F.3d 388, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because
Selinger has not submitted evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as
to lack of probable cause, summary judgment was properly granted to Greene on
this claim.
2. Abuse of Process
Selinger's
§ 1983 claim for abuse of process requires him to prove that Greene acted with
malice, i.e., "with intent to do harm without excuse [or] justification,
and . . . in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the
legitimate ends of the process." Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 70 (2d
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). On this record, there is no
proof that Greene acted with such intent. To the extent Selinger urges an
inference of malice from the lack of probable cause, see id. (noting
that lack of probable cause permits inference of malice), his claim fails for
reasons discussed in the prior section of this order.
Nor
can plaintiffs sustain this claim on the grounds that Greene sought Selinger's
arrest and indictment for the collateral purposes of extracting restitution
payments and attracting publicity. The record shows that the district
attorney's office, not Greene, was responsible for demanding restitution in
exchange for Selinger's guilty plea, as well as for the news release issued
after Selinger and his co-defendants were indicted. Because those actions
cannot be ascribed to Greene, Selinger fails to establish a triable issue of
malice. Greene was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the abuse of
process claim.
3. State Law Claims
Because
Greene was entitled to summary judgment on Paul Selinger's federal claims, the
district court was within its discretion to decline exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state law claims. See Doninger v.
Niehoff, 642
F.3d 334, 357 (2d Cir. 2011).
4. Conclusion
We
have considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR
THE COURT:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
