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Showing posts with label Judge Alice Schlesinger. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Alice Schlesinger. Show all posts

Sunday, July 9, 2017

NY State Supreme Court Judge Alice Schlesinger Grants Eileen Smith's Article 78 and Defines Verbal Abuse (2006)



SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK: IAS PART 16 ------ X
EILEEN SMITH,
Petitioner,
- against -                                                        Index No. 118947/06
Motion Seq. No. 001
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and JOEL KLEIN, as the Chancellor
of City School District of the City of New York,
Respondents.
SCHLESINGER, J.:
On October 21, 2003, the first day of the implementation of a new policy at Far Rockaway High School where petitioner Eileen Smith was a tenured Social Studies teacher, an incident occurred which led to an unsatisfactory rating for Ms. Smith dated June 24, 2004, for the 2003-2004 school year. It is this rating that petitioner is challenging by way of this Article 78 proceeding.
The new policy consisted of periodic sweeps by the school administrators as a means of forcing students to get to their classrooms on time. One minute after the late bell had rung signaling that classes had changed, teachers were required to lock their classroom doors. The locked-out students would then have to report to an assigned place to get a special pass to be admitted to their classrooms. The students, not unexpectedly, were hostile to this new procedure, and in the petitioner's class, the ones locked out banged on her door to compel the teacher to let them in. Ms. Smith then attempted to leave the room to get help, but two students in the classroom barred her way by holding the door closed. She became desperate.[1]
Ms. Smith sought help, which finally came when the Assistant Principal appeared. By that time, things had quieted down. However, at her hearing Ms. Smith acknowledged having used inappropriate language during the chaotic time. Her UFT adviser, who was present and represented her at her hearing, said that Ms. Smith had said: “This ‘fucking’ language has to stop. I do not want abusive or profane talk in the class." Ms. Smith had also reportedly said: “I will not continue until the stupids stop," and then presumably in an effort to clarify added: “I mean the stupid remarks. I am not calling anyone stupid.”
After the incident, an investigation was conducted by the principal, Cheryll Jones (later retired and thus unavailable to testify at the hearing). This investigation included a review of statements by members of the class, as well as a meeting with Ms. Smith. It was concluded by a November 12, 2003 letter to Ms. Smith from Principal Jones finding that petitioner had “committed acts which are prohibited by the Chancellor’s Regulation A-420 Corporal Punishment and Chancellor’s Regulation A-420 Verbal Abuse which constitutes unacceptable teacher deportment.” The letter concluded that the finding “may lead to disciplinary action, including an Unsatisfactory rating and termination.”
Petitioner filed a grievance challenging this letter, one at which she prevailed after a hearing held on December 7, 2005. The arbitrator, Martin F. Scheinman, Esq., ruled in a decision dated January 3, 2006, that:
The letter of November 12, 2003 shall be deleted from Eileen Smith’s file because it is unfair and inaccurate as these terms have been defined by the parties.
Mr. Scheinman, however, limited the effect of his ruling to the discrete issue before him, stating that:
This decision shall not be cited by either party as a determination of the underlying facts nor shall it preclude either party from relitigating the underlying facts.
Before this January 3, 2006, determination of the grievance challenging the November 2003 letter, Ms. Smith had been given a copy of the June 15, 2004 “Unsatisfactory" rating at issue herein. Ms. Smith had signed to acknowledge receipt of the "U-Rating” on June 24 and had immediately appealed it. However, she had also asked to postpone the appeal until she had received a final decision on her grievance challenging the letter. Thus, after Arbitrator Scheinman had ruled in Ms. Smith’s favor regarding the letter in January 2006, Ms. Smith’s union representative informed the Department’s Office of Appeals that she wished to expedite her appeal of the U-Rating.
That hearing was held on May 31, 2006 before the Chancellor’s designated Chairperson, Leila G. Zuckerman. Ms. Smith was accompanied by her union representative, Michael Gotlieb. Denise Hallett, the current principal of the Far Rockaway school, was there, and the Assistant Principal Jocelyn Badette appeared by telephone.
In the “Background Data” section of her decision, Chairperson Zuckerman stated that: “The basis of this ‘Unsatisfactory’ rating was a substantiated A-420." This remark had been taken directly from the U-Rating which Principal Jones had prepared where the comment appears under "Additional Remarks." The A-420 itself had been prepared by
Assistant Principal Badette. This document, which was used at the hearing over the
petitioner’s objection because she had not been given a copy of it until a few minutes
before the hearing, was largely relied upon by the Chairperson in sustaining the U-rating.
That,togetherwith Mr. Gotlieb’s acknowledgment that Ms. Smith had made the statements
quoted earlier, formed the basis for the decision denying Ms. Smith’s appeal. Specifically,
Chairperson Zuckerman made the following findings:
The Chairperson carefully considered the facts and various arguments presented by the Appellant and the Administration.
The documentation, although substantial in part, leaves many questions about the hostile environment which escalated into an incident. Ms. Smith called for help three times. When the A.P. arrived, she found the class to be quiet.
Unfortunately it has been clearly acknowledged that inappropriate language was used by the Appellant. This may also have motivated some of the hostility in the class. The A- 420 does acknowledge that inappropriate language constitutes verbal abuse.
It is recommended that the appeal be denied and rating of “Unsatisfactory" be sustained.
Discussion
Both sides here agree that teacher evaluations and appeals of Unsatisfactory Ratings must be conducted in compliance with the formal procedures promulgated pursuant to Section 102.2(o)(a) of the New York State Commission of Education Regulations. In the City of New York, those procedures are set forth primarily in two Handbooks prepared by the Division of Human Resources; namely, “Rating Pedagogical Staff Members” and “The Appeal Process." The “Rating” Handbook emphasizes the importance of completing evaluations based on documents in the teacher’s file. “The
Appeal Process” requires, among other things, that before the hearing, the teacher/appellant "be furnished with a complete set of the documentation used by the Rating Officer to support the reason(s) for the adverse rating" (Section A2).
In the case at bar, petitioner Smith asserts that the decision denying her appeal of the Unsatisfactory Rating was arbitrary and capricious and made in violation of lawful procedures. Specifically, petitioner asserts that Chairperson Zuckerman erred in relying on (1) various student statements which had been excluded from the file; and (2) the A-420 Report which had not been provided in advance. Had those documents been excluded as they should have been, no rational basis would exist for the decision, petitioner asserts. Respondent counters that Chairperson Zuckerman properly considered the A-420 and made a rational decision based on the evidence.
Turning first to the student statements, the record is clear that petitioner prevailed at her grievance challenging the November 12, 2003 letter from Principal Jones, and that Arbitrator Scheinman directed that the letter be deleted from Eileen Smith’s file as "unfair and inaccurate.” Chairperson Zuckerman properly sustained petitioner’s objection to the admission of the letter at the appeal of the U-Rating on this ground. Those student statements referred to in the letter and attached to it should also have been excluded. To the extent the Board offered additional student statements at the appeal which may not have been attached to the letter, those statements should have been excluded because they had not been shown to petitioner before the hearing as required by the above-quoted Section A2 of the Appeals Process.
The A-420 should have been excluded as well. The Chairperson erred in overruling petitioner’s objection to the inclusion of the A-420, stating that: "It’s not given to the teachers.” (Transcript, p. 5). Respondent contends that petitioner’s objection had no basis in the rules. However, as noted above, Section A2 of The Appeals Process Handbook expressly entitles the teacher to "a complete set of the used and expressly referred to the A-420 documentation used by the Rating Officer”, and the Rating Officer in this case (Principal Jones) in the U-Rating at issue. Neither the Chairperson, nor the Respondent Board, has pointed to any specific rule or regulation which would override Section A2 and entitle the Board to withhold the A-420 from petitioner while still relying on it at the hearing.
The Commissioner and the courts have held that a U-Rating cannot be sustained where, as here, the Chairperson improperly relies on documents which should have been excluded from consideration at the teacher’s appeal. Thus, for example, in The Appeal of
Naomi Dowrie, 45 Ed. Dept. Rep. ________ , Decision No. 15,506 (Dec. 22, 2006), the
Commissioner reversed the decision by the Chancellor’s designee to sustain a U-Rating because the decision relied on documents which had not been included in the teacher’s file and shown to the teacher in advance. Citing to various provisions in the “Rating" Handbook, the Chancellor’s designee emphasized the importance of including relevant documents in the file in advance of the hearing so the teacher could grieve them and seek their removal. If it fails to provide the teacher with that opportunity, the Board may not consider the documents at the appeal of the U-Rating.
Wholly unavailing is respondent's attempt to distinguish Dowrie on the ground that the excluded documents were the only documents relied upon by the Chancellor in that case. Respondent does not, and cannot, challenge the principle in Dowrie that a U-Rating cannot be sustained based pn documents which the Board failed to give the teacher in advance.
This same principle was recently applied by Justice Lewis Bart Stone in Mangone v. Board of Education, Index No. 117353/06, Aug. 3, 2007, (Sup. Ct., NY Co). In Mangone, the Court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss the teacher’s petition which challenged, among other things, an unsatisfactory rating. Citing to Dowrie, the court reiterated the rule that a U-Rating cannot be sustained based solely on documents which had not been provided to the teacher in advance of the hearing as part of the file.
Respondent nevertheless argues that the U-Rating was properly sustained based
on the A-420. As discussed above, this Court disagrees based on the requirement in “The
Appeals Process" Handbook that the teacher be shown all documents in advance of the
appeal hearing. But even if the A-420 were properly relied upon by Chairperson
Zuckerman at the hearing, it does not suffice to support the determination. The A-420 is
a pre-printed form with a box checked that merely indicates “The allegations were
substantiated.” The allegations are those in the November 12, 2003 letter from Principal
Jones and the various student statements, both of which were referenced and made a part
of the A-420.[2] The A-420 also contains a typewritten "description of incident” which simply
paraphrases the student statements and reads as follows:
Student [name redacted] alleges that Ms. Smith grabbed a statement that student wrote complaining about the teacher, “pushed it into her pocket and then pushed her into the door”.
Another student [name redacted] alleges that Ms. Smith called the class "stupid” and said that the “fucking has to stop”. [Name redacted] also alleges that while she was trying to help [name redacted] Ms. Smith pushed her breaking her nail against the board.


Lastly, the A-420 contains the typewritten conclusion of the Assistant Principal which reads as follows:
The teacher committed acts which are prohibited by the Chancellor’s Regulation A-420 Corporal Punishment and Chancellor’s Regulation A-420 Verbal Abuse which constitutes unacceptable teacher deportment.
Significantly, as Chairperson Zuckerman indicated in her decision quoted above (at p. 4), when the Assistant Principal finally responded to Ms. Smith’s three calls for help, she found the room quiet. Therefore, the description of the incident and the conclusion stated in the A-420 are not based on any personal observation by any administrator; instead, they are based solely on the hearsay statements written by the students. Thus, the A-420, by itself, cannot support the U-Rating.
Without the various documents, the only evidence left is the undisputed fact that Ms. Smith made the above-quoted statements in the midst of an extremely difficult time in class. Presumably recognizing this point, Chairperson Zuckerman in her decision did not find that Ms. Smith had engaged in prohibited corporal punishment. Rather, she made a finding - somewhat reluctantly - of prohibited verbal abuse based on the statement by petitioner’s union representative that the language Ms. Smith used was "inappropriate”. The Chairperson’s reluctance is revealed by her finding that the evidence “leaves many questions," by her emphasis on Ms. Smith’s repeated calls for help, by her confirmation that the Assistant Principal found the room quiet when she finally responded, and by her statement that Ms. Smith “unfortunately" acknowledged using “inappropriate” language at the hearing.
But even an acknowledgment of “inappropriate” language does not support a finding of prohibited verbal abuse. The Chancellor’s Regulation A-421 defines verbal abuse as:
                   Language that tends to cause fear or physical or mental distress;
                  Language that includes words denoting racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual orientation which tends to cause fear or physical or mental distress;
                   Language that tends to threaten physical harm; or
                   Language that tends to belittle or subject students to ridicule.
Respondent cannot reasonably claim that the language falls into any of the first three categories since no evidence exists of any words which caused fear or threatened harm. At most, the Board can claim that the language “tends to belittle or subject students to ridicule." But when Ms. Smith’s words are examined in context, they fail to meet that standard. Clearly, Ms. Smith was attempting to gain control of the students in a chaotic situation and to compel them to stop using inappropriate language and making inappropriate remarks. She made clear that she herself was not cursing at the students or calling them stupid. Ultimately, Ms. Smith achieved her goal because the class was quiet when the Assistant Principal arrived. Thus, while it may well be that Ms. Smith could have achieved her goal by using different language, it cannot reasonably be said that the language she used qualifies as prohibited verbal abuse as defined in the Regulations sufficient to support an Unsatisfactory Rating.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ADJUDGED that the petition is granted, the denial of petitioner’s appeal of the Unsatisfactory Rating is annulled, and the Unsatisfactory Rating shall be removed from the file.
This constitutes the decision and judgment of this Court.  



The facts related here are taken from the decision by Committee Chairperson Leila G. Zuckerman, which denied Ms. Smith’s appeal of the unsatisfactory rating after a hearing on May 31, 2006. The denial was upheld by the Chancellor on August 28, 2006. The petition timely challenges that denial. In the background data of Ms. Zuckemnan’s decision, she states (referring to Ms. Smith): “It was clear that she became desperate”.
[2] As noted above, Chairperson Zuckerman properly excluded the letter, and the student statements were, or should have been, excluded as well.

Tuesday, January 5, 2016

David Suker: A Final Word on His 6-Year Ordeal Ending in His Precedent-Setting Win in Court

David Suker, a teacher/whistleblower of the improper conditions in the classrooms for his at-risk students in the Bronx, gives below an inside look at his life after he was placed in the infamous rubber rooms by the Gotcha Squad.


He never gave up, and won not only his job back, but more than $250,000 as well as the admiration of New York City and all teachers who have, are, or will be similarly charged. There is hope out there.

From David:  

"The saga of my current ordeal, the three year termination of my ability to teach in NYC schools, and subsequent reinstatement by some of the highest courts in New York, specifically the New York State Supreme Court and the Appellate Division, oddly began back in August of 2008 on my way to the Democratic National Convention in Denver to witness history. Barack Obama was being nominated, and as a licensed high school social studies teacher, I wanted to say that I was there. Well that didn't happen.

While riding my Vespa Scooter to the convention from New York City, about 100 miles from Denver I was blindsided by an 18 wheeler from behind. It's safe to say I was lucky that I escaped with my life -- a broken jaw, some really bad scrapes and nothing more. I took three months off to recuperate, but when I came back to teach I was placed in a stairwell, outside of the main office, where the main office to my program, GED-Plus was located, with no teaching responsibilities. At the time I thought this was odd, but I was just glad I was alive and back to making a living. I didn't view this as punishment, but now with hindsight, I see how vindictive this system can be.

The reason I was sitting in the stairwell – I sat there for over a month before the administration of GED-Plus grudgingly sent me back to my site to teach my GED students -- had nothing to do with my competency but did have everything to do with my big mouth. You see, my principal, Robert Zweig, had been appointed Deputy Superintendent to District 79 (the district composed of alternative high schools and programs) a year previous, but his appointment was held up because of allegations that he had a liaison with an assistant principal. The investigation took about a year and I'm pretty sure he was cleared, but I suspect that now he was in a position of even more power, he felt emboldened to go after those teachers who had been speaking out about him and his leadership of the program.

The previous incarnation of GED-Plus was called OES, or Offsite Educational Services, and that was closed in June of 2007. Principal Zweig was promoted, the teachers had to reapply for their jobs, and we were all very nervous. Few people spoke out, but I did and now I see the price was huge. I was put in the Rubber Room for 18 months shortly after being placed back in the classroom in 2009, but no charges were ever brought.

The Rubber Rooms were supposedly closed in June of 2010, and in October of that year I finally went back to teaching. I wasn't sent back to my old site on 145th Street in Harlem where I had previously been so successful, helping get over one hundred students their GED's over a three year period in a one teacher site.

No, I was sent to a dumping ground for teachers and students alike at Bronx Regional High School, a GED-Plus "Hub" with multiple classrooms where our 17-21-year-old students were the most disenfranchised in the system. This ESL/Literacy/Pre-GED site was where I was to be kept an eye on by my principal. I know this because I was standing outside my AP's door on my first day there and I overheard his conversation with her.

Things at this new site were not terrible by NYC standards, but even I was surprised at the lack of concern for moving our students into more advanced programs. All the administration cared about was attendance and enrollment. At the end of the year I was given an Unsatisfactory rating and a $1,000 fine for the ten absences. Most of my absences revolved around the care for my dad who has Parkinson's, but Zweig didn't bother to ask.

Then Occupy happened. I was arrested at the lead of the march across Brooklyn Bridge and four more times. I plead guilty to one violation, and was found guilty of of another because I ignored the lawful order to get off the bridge. I was happily an "Occupier" and teacher and felt the two could coincide. That thought didn't last very long. At the time of my third arrest, the DoE removed me from the classroom, placed me in a "working" Rubber Room and started a full-on 3020-a termination hearing against me.

The DOE started digging up the most minuscule offenses from my past to charge me with. When even that wasn't enough to silence my criticism of the DOE and its policies affecting at-risk youth, a "memo" was sent. The DoE wanted to know where my daughter lived because she was at a NYC high school and in 10th grade, and I was living part-time in Long Island, taking care of my dad.

Without my knowledge, they interrogated my daughter at least three times, finally getting her to admit that she lived in the Bronx with her mom. My daughter never told me or her mother about any of this because of the shame and responsibility that she felt for getting me in trouble. They sent undercover investigators to her house and to the management company for the apartment in which she lived. They also knew her mom's and my dad's automobile license numbers and were secretly watching them for some substantial amount of time, which I learned from all the details in the Special Commission of Investigations report that I first saw during the middle of my 3020-a proceedings.

This final charge of "defrauding" the DoE was what got me fired. The problem with that charge is that I never committed fraud, plus the charges went back years ago, to when she was in kindergarten, 1st grade, and 5th grade, when I applied and enrolled my daughter into the three public schools that she attended. This fraud charge was erroneous because I was living in multiple addresses in the districts where my daughter’s schools were located and I didn’t have a permanent address from the time my daughter was in kindergarten.

There is a three year limit for which you can bring 3020-a charges and this "fraud" charge was clearly past that point, because my daughter was in her 2nd semester of 10th grade. They tried getting around this by arguing that this was "criminal" conduct, but never attempted to prove this was a criminal offense to the arbitrator, let alone in criminal court.

The fraud charge was thrown out in 2013 by the New York Supreme Court and the remaining charges were remanded to another DOE arbitrator for punishment less than termination. Here is an excerpt from the Supreme Court decision from Judge Alice Schlesinger:

"As this Court stated earlier, the school’s leadership did not want petitioner Suker to remain there as a teacher. They did not like him or approve of his actions. They believed he was insubordinate, that he did not conduct himself properly, that he was getting arrested too often, and probably that he was not a team player. It is possible that much of that is true. But with the exception of the two episodes involving disruptive students, which had occurred almost three years earlier in 2009 and had not resulted in discipline, no one has claimed that David Suker is not a good and/or effective teacher.

Finally, it should be noted that the conduct spelled out in Charge 3, regarding a false address for his daughter, never involved Suker’s own school and never would have been discovered but for the DOE’S decision to target Suker to see if an investigation could find something to be used against him, which it did. But that “something” should not be a basis for terminating this tenured teacher, for the reasons already discussed.”



But the DOE refused to give up, and appealed the case to the Appellate Court, where they lost once again, wasting another two years of my life and thousands more in taxpayers’ dollars.

The lesson that I've garnered from this more than seven year odyssey is that the system is irrevocably broken, but that at least a few teachers can seek out and find justice, myself included. Imagine though for a second what happens to the student that is caught up in a similar Orwellian nightmare, which I'm guessing is not all that uncommon.

If I almost succumbed to multiple threats over the past several years and I'm a veteran, father, and "educated professional," with everything to live for, then what are our students and their parents facing? It's those nightmares that I try to avoid when I fall asleep at night, but the reality isn't so kind.

Thank you for listening. :)"

-- David Suker

Monday, October 12, 2015

New York State Supreme Court Judge Alice Schlesinger Rules in Favor of Substitute Teacher 2009

New York State Supreme Court Judge Alice Schlesinger (one of the BEST!) decided in favor of the Petitioner, Talib El, who asked the Court to give him back a job with the NYC DOE as a substitute teacher. (2009)

Betsy Combier, Editor
President, ADVOCATZ 

Matter of El v New York City Dept. of Educ.

Annotate this Case
[*1] Matter of El v New York City Dept. of Educ. 2009 NY Slip Op 50883(U) [23 Misc 3d 1121(A)] Decided on April 1, 2009 Supreme Court, New York County Schlesinger, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. 

Decided on April 1, 2009 
Supreme Court, New York County 

In the Matter of the Application of Talib A. El, Petitioner, 

against

The New York City Department of Education, Joel Klein, as Chancellor of The New York City Department of Education, and Lawrence Becker, as Chief Executive of the Division of Human Resources of the New York City Department of Education, Respondents. 

401571/08 

Attorney for Deft 
Daniel Gomez-Sanchez 
Corp. Counsel 
100 Church Street, Room 2-317 
New York, NY 10007 
212-788-0883 

Attorney for Plaintiff 
MFY Legal Services 
299 Broadway, 4th fl. 
New York, NY 10012 
212-417-3700 

Alice Schlesinger, J.
Petitioner Talib El commenced this Article 78 proceeding to annul the March 3, 2008 decision by respondent New York City Department of Education (DOE) denying his application for employment as a substitute teacher. Petitioner asserts that the decision is arbitrary and capricious and discriminatory in that it gives undue weight to the fact that he pleaded guilty to various crimes more than 20 years ago and fails to give appropriate consideration to the substantial evidence he presented in his favor, including a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities issued by the Parole Board.
Respondent DOE opposes the petition, asserting that it properly evaluated all the relevant factors outlined in the Correction Law and correctly denied Mr. El's application on the ground that: "In light of [your criminal record history], granting employment will pose an unreasonable risk to the safety and welfare of the school community." DOE also asserts that it did not receive a copy of the Certificate of Disabilities until after its decision had been rendered. 

The Governing Law Prohibits Discrimination
Petitioner's claims in this case rely in large part on Article 23-A of the Correction Law.[FN1] Included in that Article is Correction Law §752 which bars discrimination against persons previously [*2]convicted of criminal offenses. Pursuant to that law, employment cannot be denied based on an applicant's criminal history unless one or both of the following exceptions is found to apply: 

(1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the specific license or employment sought or held by the individual; or 

(2) the issuance or continuation of the license or the granting or continuation of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public. 

In the case at bar, as noted above, petitioner's employment application was denied because, in light of his criminal history, his employment posed an "unreasonable risk" to the school community within the meaning of the above-quoted exception.
Section 753, subd. (1), provides a list of eight factors which the potential employer "shall consider" when making a determination pursuant to §752 whether the "unreasonable risk" exception applies. See, Arrocha v Board of Education of the City of New York, 93 NY2d 361, 364 (1999). Those factors include the following: 

(a) The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses. 

(b) The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment sought or held by the person. 

(c) The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities. 

(d) The time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses. 

(e) The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses. 

(f) The seriousness of the offense or offenses. 

(g) Any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct. 

(h) The legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.
As particularly relevant here, and in conjunction with factor (g) above, subdivision 2 of that same section requires the potential employer to consider any Certificate of Disabilities issued to the applicant, "which certificate shall create a presumption of rehabilitation in regard to the offense or offenses specified therein."
In the case at bar, the Board of Parole issued petitioner a permanent Certificate of Disabilities on August 29, 2007 pursuant to Correction Law §703. The Certificate refers to petitioner's sentencing on March 31, 1988 for the crime of Burglary in the Second Degree and expressly states [*3]that it "removes all legal bars and disabilities to employment, license and privilege except those pertaining to firearms under Sections 265.01(4) and 400.00 of the Penal Law and except the right to be eligible for public office." 

Petitioner Presented Substantial Evidence in Support of his Application 

As he properly asserts, petitioner presented to the Board of Education substantial evidence in support of his employment application. Admittedly, between 1985 and 1987, petitioner pled guilty to five misdemeanors involving Trespass, Petit Larceny, and Criminal Mischief. Additionally, on July 3, 1987, he pled guilty to Burglary, a Class C felony. During those years, petitioner was 18-20 years old. He is now about 42 years old.
Along with his seven-page employment application, filed in or about February 2007, petitioner demonstrated that he had been rehabilitated since his last conviction some 20 years ago. For example, he had not only obtained a high school diploma through a GED program, but he had also obtained a Bachelor's of Science in Human Resources from Touro College in 2000 and a Master's of Science in Counseling and Education from Long Island University in 2003.
During that time, petitioner obtained various licenses and accreditations. The New York State Education Department issued him a license to practice as a Mental Health Counselor through July 31, 2009. In 2002, he was also accredited by the State as an Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Counselor Trainee. In 2006 the State Education Department certified petitioner as a Teaching Assistant and awarded a provisional certificate valid through 2011 to work as a School Counselor. That same year he was licensed by the State as a Mental Health Counselor. He also received training related to HIV and STD's.
In connection with these certifications, petitioner worked in various capacities. From 1997 through 2002, he held internships providing counseling for mental health patients and community members. From 1999 through 2003, he worked as a Counselor at Creedmor Psychiatric Center. In 2003, he was employed as a Youth Supervisor for the Oneida County Workforce where he supervised a youth program. From 2004-2006, he worked as a counselor with developmentally disabled adults and youth at a Community Center in Albany. Thereafter, beginning in or about March of 2006, he worked as a substitute teacher at the New Covenant Charter School in Albany and then at Albany High School until he relocated to New York City and applied for the substitute teaching position at issue herein. In support of his application, petitioner also presented numerous references.
On July 11, 2007, petitioner appeared for an interview with respondent Board of Education at which time his background and criminal convictions were explored in detail. The following day, petitioner wrote to the interviewer, Ms. Patricia Hanks, confirming some of the things he had sought to explain at the interview. He reiterated that he had lived in foster care during the ages 11-18 and then was homeless, which had led him to commit theft for survival. He expressed his remorse, detailed his rehabilitation, and explained his reasons for becoming a teacher: "Today my direct goal is to help and prevent children from becoming homeless and living [a] self destructive life. This starts with education and commitment from people like myself who have struggled to learn about who I am and what I can offer someone who needs support." (See Exhibit A to Petitioner's Aff.).
According to the affidavit of Judith Kay, DOE's Deputy Director for Employee Relations (Exh. 15 to Answer), all of the above facts were considered by Ms. Kay as part of her review and determination of petitioner's application. By letter dated March 3, 2008, Ms. Kay notified petitioner [*4]that the Board had denied his application. (Exh. 16 to Answer). In that letter, Ms. Kay gave great wight to petitioner's criminal history. Indeed, she began by detailing petitioner's five convictions from the late 1980's. She then listed in general terms the other factors she had considered, many of which are listed in Correction Law §753(1), quoted above. Ms. Kay expressly acknowledged that the application could not be denied based on a criminal conviction absent a finding, pursuant to §752, of a direct relationship between the employment sought and the prior conviction, or that granting employment would pose an unreasonable risk to the safety or welfare of individuals. She then stated her conclusion as follows: 

Your application for a substitute teacher position is denied based on your criminal record history detailed above including a serious felony conviction. In light of this, granting employment will pose an unreasonable risk to the safety and welfare of the school community. 

Significantly, the letter then advised petitioner of his right to submit additional information 

in support of his application, stating as follows: 

If you have any additional information that you believe has not yet been considered you may submit it in writing to the Director of Employee Relations, Division of Human Resources at 65 Court Street, Room 200, Brooklyn, New York 11201.
Petitioner did precisely that. He wrote to Director Gordon protesting the decision to deny his application based on the prior offenses in light of the overwhelming evidence of his rehabilitation. (Exh B to Petitioner Aff.). He attached his Teaching Certificate, his School Counselor Certificate, his Mental Health Counselor Certificate, and two exceptional reference letters.
In addition, and quite significantly, he attached the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities issued him by the Board of Parole. The Certificate had been issued on August 29, 2007, after petitioner's interview had been held but before his application had been denied. While petitioner asserts in his petition (at ¶19) that he submitted the Certificate "in support of his application", he suggests in his affidavit (at ¶8) that he first submitted it in response to the denial letter, and Ms. Kay unequivocally attests that she did not review it as part of petitioner's application before she rendered her March 3, 2008 denial (see Kay Aff. at ¶16). In any event, the DOE in its March 3, 2008 denial letter explicitly advised petitioner of his right to submit additional relevant information, and respondent does not dispute that the Certificate of Disabilities falls into that category. However, the BOE never responded to petitioner's post-denial submission, and it appears that it never considered the Certificate. 

The Decision Denying Petitioner's Application is Arbitrary and Capricious
While the Board of Education has a certain amount of discretion in determining whether to hire a teacher, the decision must be annulled where, as here, it is arbitrary and capricious and fails to properly consider all the factors required by law. Arrocha, 93 NY2d at 363. As the Court of Appeals emphasized in Bonacorsa v Van Lindt, 71 NY2d 605, 611 (1988), "Article 23-A of the Correction Law was enacted in 1976 in an attempt to eliminate the effect of bias against ex-offenders which prevented them from obtaining employment. ... [The law] sought to remove this obstacle to employment by imposing an obligation on employers and public agencies to deal equitably with ex-[*5]offenders while also protecting society's interest in assuring performance by reliable and trustworthy persons." To that end, "the statute sets out a broad general rule" barring potential employers from denying employment solely based on the applicant's status as an ex-offender unless one of the two exceptions noted above applies: a "direct relationship" exists between the crime and the employment, or the applicant's employment poses an "unreasonable risk" to individuals or the community. 71 NY2d at 611-612.
Relying on Arrocha, supra, respondent Board of Education argues in the case at bar that it properly denied petitioner's substitute teacher application based on its finding that, in light of petitioner's criminal history, he posed an "unreasonable risk" to the students. It correctly notes that a finding of unreasonable risk "depends upon a subjective analysis of a variety of considerations relating to the nature of the license or employment sought and the prior misconduct." Arrocha, quoting Bonacorsa, 71 NY2d at 612. It further argues that it considered the statutory factors listed above which it was required to consider under Correction Law §753.
However, as petitioner correctly notes, Arrocha is readily distinguishable from the case at bar when one considers the various factors. For example, the applicant in Arrocha was a mature adult when he committed the crime at issue, which was the sale of a controlled substance, a crime of particular concern due to the Board's duty to protect school children from drugs. In this case, petitioner had just been released from foster care onto the streets at the age of 18 when he committed the crimes at issue, and the crimes involved crimes of property. Some twenty years have passed since petitioner's last conviction, and he has proven himself during that time by obtaining relevant training and employment, including significant employment in positions involving youth as well as teaching. His letters of recommendation were numerous and outstanding.
Perhaps the most significant factor which distinguishes this case from Arrocha is the fact that the BOE here did not consider petitioner's Certificate of Relief from Disabilities. As made clear by Correction Law §753(2) and by the Court of Appeals in Arrocha and Bonacorsa, the Certificate creates a presumption of rehabilitation. While the Certificate does not establish a prima facie entitlement to the employment, the presumption of rehabilitation constitutes significant evidence in petitioner's favor and is one of the eight factors which the Board must consider when determining whether the "unreasonable risk" exception applies. [See Correction Law §753(1)(g), quoted above at p. 3].
The Board's decision in this case is also deficient in that, while some of the eight factors are mentioned in the March 3, 2008 denial letter, they are mentioned in conclusory fashion only, and no discussion is included of the particular facts of this case to demonstrate how the various factors were evaluated and what weight each was given. Absent a more detailed application of the factors to the evidence presented in this case, the Court cannot assess whether the Board truly considered all the record evidence and applied the eight factors in a manner that was consistent with the letter and spirit of the law. See Marra v City of White Plains, 96 AD2d 17 (Third Dep't 1983), cited with approval in Bonacorsa and Davis-Elliott v New York City Department of Education, 31 AD2d 266 (First Dep't 2006)(decision denying employment application properly annulled where the rejection was unlawful in the manner in which respondents considered the factors set forth in Correction Law §753); see also Black v New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Development Disabilities, 20 Misc 3d 581, 586 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 2008)(rejecting as [*6]arbitrary "general catchall statements" with no attempt to address the specifics).
Although the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency, it has a duty to insure that the law is properly applied and that the decision is not based upon "speculative inferences unsupported by the record." Matter of Sled Hill Café v Hostetter, 22 NY2d 607, 612-613. Respondent's March 3, 2008 denial letter is particularly problematic here in that petitioner's criminal history is the only evidence detailed in any meaningful respect. Thus, the decision on the whole, as drafted, suggests that it was based primarily, if not entirely, on petitioner's criminal history, with little consideration of the other evidence and statutory factors.
For all these reasons, this Court finds that respondent's decision denying petitioner's substitute teacher application is arbitrary and capricious and must be annulled. The Board of Education failed to consider petitioner's Certificate of Relief from Disabilities and has not adequately demonstrated that it considered all eight of the statutorily-required factors in light of the specific evidence presented by petitioner in this case. The appropriate remedy is a remand to the Board for a detailed consideration of all eight factors, including a determination whether the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities would benefit this applicant in light of the public policy encouraging the employment of ex-offenders so that petitioner's positive factors outweigh the negative ones and warrant the granting of his application.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ADJUDGED that the petition is granted, respondent's March 3, 2008 denial of petitioner's application is annulled, and the matter is remanded for a new determination which applies the statutory presumption related to the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities and otherwise evaluates the relevant factors in accordance with the terms of this decision.
This constitutes the decision and judgment of this Court. 

Dated: April 1, 2009
_______________________
J.S.C. 

Attorney for Deft 
Daniel Gomez-Sanchez 
Corp. Counsel 
100 Church Street, Room 2-317 
New York, NY 10007 
212-788-0883 

Attorney for Plaintiff 
MFY Legal Services 
299 Broadway, 4th fl. 
New York, NY 10012 
212-417-3700 Footnotes 

Footnote 1:Petitioner also relies on the New York State Human Rights Law, found at Executive Law §296(15), and the New York City Human Rights Law, found in the Administrative Code at §8-107(10), both of which bar public employment discrimination based on conviction alone.