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Showing posts with label procedural rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label procedural rights. Show all posts

Friday, April 14, 2017

Dharmvir Gehlaut has a Cause of Action in Supreme Court, as the NYC DOE did not Follow Proper Procedures in Rating Him

Despite what the NYC Department of Education Attorneys argue in all the Courts in New York State, procedures are important.

In the Matter of Gehlaut, New York State Supreme Court Judge Joan Lobis wrote in her decision to deny the NYC DOE their Motion To Dismiss:

"The petition alleges in pertinent part that the Respondents violated lawful procedures in rating Petitioner's performance as Unsatisfactory and upholding that rating on appeal......In this instance, this Court finds that Petitioner has stated a cause of action because the procedures cited are lawful procedures to which Respondents may be held bound. The language of the relevant provisions are not precatory but rather mandate that Respondents must document an adverse rating, which petitioner plainly alleges was not done in this case. Moreover, to sustain an appeal of an adverse rating the reviewing body must have shown before it all elements of the basis for which to support that rating. Again Petitioner has plainly alleged that essential elements of supporting documents have not been admitted in this case either on appeal or in Petitioner's personnel file.

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Betsy Combier
 betsy.combier@gmail.com
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MATTER OF GEHLAUT v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF THE CITY SCH. DIST. OF THE CITY OF N.Y.
Docket No. 103366/2012, Sequence No. 001.


2013 NY Slip Op 30339(U)
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF DHARMVIR GEHLAUT, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and DENNIS M. WALCOTT, as Chancellor of the City School District of the City of New York, Respondents.
Supreme Court, New York County.
February 13, 2013.
Filed February 15, 2013.


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Decision and Order
JOAN B. LOBIS, Judge.

Dharmvir Gehlaut petitions under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules for an order nullifying Gehlaut's teaching evaluation rating as affirmed on administrative appeal and directing Respondents Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York and Dennis M. Walcott (collectively "BOE") to issue a different rating. Respondents cross-move under C.P.L.R. Rule 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action. For the following reasons, the cross-motion to dismiss is denied.

The facts set forth are gleaned from the papers filed in this action and construed in the light most favorable to Petitioner as non-moving party to Respondents' cross-motion to dismiss. Petitioner Dharmvir Gehlaut has been employed by Respondents since 2005. In 2010, he was a tenured teacher of math at Emma Lazarus High School for English Language Scholars here in New York City. On June 28, 2011, the school's Principal, Melody Kellogg, signed a teaching evaluation that rated Gehlaut as Unsatisfactory for the 2010-2011 school year. Gehlaut signed the evaluation on September 1, 2011. Section 4 of the evaluation, which lists supporting documentation, is blank.

Petitioner grieved the rating and a hearing was conducted on the appeal on January 27, 2012. Gehlaut was represented by his union representative. At that hearing Respondents attempted to introduce into evidence three observation reports, two prepared by the school's assistant principal, and one by the principal, and a letter dated March 28, 2011, from Principal Kellogg to Gehlaut. Each proffered document contained an acknowledgment stating "I have received a copy of this letter and understand a copy will be placed in my file." There was a signature line and date. None of the acknowledgments had been executed. The hearing officer sustained objections to these items' admissibility. Respondents submitted testimony of one witness, Principal Kellogg, who participated by telephone.

On March 28, 2012, Respondents denied Gehlaut's appeal. Gehlaut filed a notice of claim on June 25, 2012, and now brings this petition. Gehlaut claims that the BOE's determinations issuing him a rating of Unsatisfactory without appropriate supporting documentation and affirming that determination on appeal violated lawful procedures, were affected by error of law, and were arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. He asks this Court as relief to change his rating to Satisfactory.

Respondents cross-move claiming that Gehlaut has failed to state a cause of action. In their memorandum of law they minimize the import of the documents' preclusion as having been made "for technical reasons." Memorandum of Law at 13. Respondents appeal to "common sense" in urging this Court to overlook those reasons. Id. While Respondents admit that the BOE did not "fully and strictly comply[] with every scintilla" of its evaluation procedures, Respondents aver that Petitioner's challenge is "repeatedly made by teachers seeking to evade the consequences of their own poor performance." Id. at 16. Respondents deny that Gehlaut has been deprived of any substantial right in the affirmance of the rating, and contend that this Court cannot "second guess" the decision of the Chancellor's Committee. Id.

A motion to dismiss under C.P.L.R. Rule 3211(a)(7) will fail if within the four corners of the pleading there are discernable facts that show a cause of action. E.g., Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275 (1977). The Court must accept as true the facts alleged in the pleading and those in the non-moving party's submission opposing the motion to dismiss, and accord the plaintiff all favorable inferences. E.g., ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. v. MBIA Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 208, 227 (2011).

This Court finds Respondents' cross-motion to be unpersuasive. Section 7803 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules provides in pertinent part that this Court may consider "whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law;" whether "a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion." Id. § 7803(1); 7803(3). The Court may grant a petitioner relief to which he is entitled including among others annulment of the determination in whole or in part and may direct specified action by the respondent. Id. § 7806.

The petition alleges in pertinent part that the Respondents violated lawful procedures in rating Petitioner's performance as Unsatisfactory and upholding that rating on appeal. Petitioner attaches at Exhibit G the Chancellor's Special Circular No. 45 and the current version of the ratings handbook promulgated pursuant to that Circular. The Circular, dated April 10, 1988, provides notice that the New York State Commissioner of Education's Regulation 100.2(o) requires that beginning in September 1987 all school districts must adopt "formal procedures" for annual reviews. Those "formal review procedures," moreover, must be placed on file in the district office and be available for review "by any individual." The BOE's Office of Appeals and Reviews publishes and addresses inquiries relating to the procedures issued in handbook form. The handbooks in their current form are entitled "Rating Pedagogical Staff Members," which also appears at Exhibit G of the petition, and appends Circular No. 45 at Appendix I, (Ratings Handbook) and "The Appeal Process," which appears at Exhibit I of the petition (Appeals Handbook).

Petitioner alleges that Respondents violated several specific formal review procedures in the Ratings Handbook. At page 3 of the Ratings Handbook, Part II addresses evaluations and ratings of personnel. Section A of that Part is entitled "Mandate and Timing." It incorporates in pertinent part Section 89, Subdivision 7 of the New York State Commissioner of Education's Regulations that mandated the timing and evaluation of employees. Quoting that Regulation, the Ratings Handbook states as follows: "`Within the last ten school days of each school year ... the principal ... shall give to each member of . . . staff a signed statement characterizing ... work as Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory....'" The quoted Regulation specifically required documentation: "`A Certification of Unsatisfactory ... shall be accompanied by appropriate supporting data.'" Gehlaut's rating sheet, which mimics the form provided in the handbook, does not list any documents in the section for documentation. Petitioner's Exh. A, at page 2 of 2.

Respondents recognize the need to document evaluations. The Ratings Handbook Foreword devotes two of its four paragraphs to that need: "concise documentation is fundamental to the process. Due to the serious implications of adverse ratings ... the need to document the evaluation of an employee's performance is essential." The Foreword also expressly addresses the importance of documentation for appellate review: "The admissibility of documents and written criticism has been defined by contractual language, grievance/arbitration decisions and rulings adjudicated by both the legal system and the State Commissioner of Education. Hence, the principal must be aware of the type and nature of documents which are germane to the evaluation of staff and the need for clear, objectively written statements."

Respondents also recognize the substantial right implicated by the procedures set forth in the Ratings Handbook. Section G of Part II is entitled, "Implications of an Adverse Rating." That section expressly acknowledges that "[r]eceipt of an Unsatisfactory rating has serious implications." Id. at 9. These can include "filing of charges against tenured employees" and may impact "an employee's ability to obtain additional licenses." Id.

At Section I, entitled Analyzing Documents and Records, the Ratings Handbook provides that evaluator must review the documents in the file. Those documents include observation reports and letters like those attempted to be introduced at the hearing in Petitioner's case. Material to be placed in a staff member's file, however, "must note that it is being placed in the official file and a signature line must be provided for the recipient of the letter; a date line should also be provided." Id. Part II.I(2)(a) at 10. See also Appendix F of the Ratings Handbook (Sample Observation Report #1). If an employee refuses to sign a document for the file "a witness should sign a dated statement on the document attesting to this refusal." It is uncontroverted that no attestation was done in this case. These unsigned documents are expressly acknowledged as inadmissible at reviews and appeals. Id. Part II.I(6)(a) at 11. The inadmissible records may, however, be used to refresh recollections in cross-examination. Id.
The right to appeal an adverse rating appears in the BOE's by-laws at Section 4.3.1, which by-laws Petitioner appends at Exh. H. Moreover, those by-laws contemplate the formal procedures promulgated pursuant to the Chancellor's Special Circular No. 45: "Any person ... in respect to an appeal from a rating of an other than a satisfactory rating ... shall be afforded the opportunity for review in the manner set forth herein and in procedures established by the Chancellor." The Circular expressly instructs "formal procedures" be developed to include "[t]he procedures for appeal from an adverse rating." Exh. G, Ratings Handbook, Apx. I, p. 1.
The Appeals Handbook, also prepared by the Office of Hearings and Review, and attached as Exhibit I of the Petition, methodically sets out the appellate procedures. The Foreword references the by-laws and the BOE's "guiding principles of fairness and impartiality regarding a pedagogical employee's rights to appeal an adverse rating." Procedural steps regarding ... documentation ... are listed and documented."

Section I the Appeals Handbook applies to all pedagogical employees and specifies the right to appeal and the review. The rating officer is required to furnish appellant "with a complete set of the documentation used by the Rating Officer to support the reasons(s) for the adverse rating." Appeals Handbook, Sec. (I)(A)(2). Appellant is then provided an opportunity to respond to documentation. Id. § (1)(A)(3). Appellant is not permitted to be represented by an attorney. Id. § (I)(B). The rating officer may stand on the written record or make oral statements "with respect to... the supporting documents previously submitted . . ." Id. § (I)(B)(2)(e). After the review, the Chancellor's Committee meets to deliberate and writes a confidential report containing findings and the rationale for the recommendation. If the appeal is granted, the adverse rating is reversed "on all school, district and central headquarters' records." Id. § (I)(B)(3). Furthermore, the rating officer is required to issue a new overall evaluation. Id.

In this instance, this Court finds that Petitioner has stated a cause of action because the procedures cited are lawful procedures to which Respondents may be held bound. The language of the relevant provisions are not precatory but rather mandate that Respondents must document an adverse rating, which petitioner plainly alleges was not done in this case. Moreover, to sustain an appeal of an adverse rating the reviewing body must have shown before it all elements of the basis for which to support that rating. Again Petitioner has plainly alleged that essential elements of supporting documents have not been admitted in this case either on appeal or in Petitioner's personnel file.

A court may compel an administrative body or officer to comply with its own rules and regulations. Frick v. Bahou, 56 N.Y.2d 777 (1982). The appellate division has long held that by-laws of the Board of Education are binding upon it. Lehman v. Board of Educ., 82 A.D.2d 832, 833 (2d Dep't 1981). The Lehman Court further held that the same principles apply to regulations promulgated by the Chancellor. Id. By corollary the court further held that rules of administrative agency that regulate procedure affecting substantial rights of individuals may not be waived by the agency. Id. at 834. In In re Blaize v. Klein, 68 A.D.3d 759 (2d Dep't 2009), the appellate division reversed the agency's determination upholding the rating officer's determination of unsatisfactory. The court referred to procedural errors made, including the respondents' failure to provide petitioner with the complete set of documents on which the determination was based within three weeks of her challenge to the determination. In that case, the court cited to then extant by-law § 5.3.4A. Notably today the by-laws merely authorize the Chancellor to "establish and publish appropriate rules for the processing of appeals." Section 5.1, p. 14 at Petitioner's Exh. H. Regardless, however, those rules promulgated by delegation are similarly binding. Lehman, 82 A.D.2d at 834; see also Kolmel v. City of New York, 88 A.D.3d 527, 528 (1st Dep't 2011) (failure to observe adversely rated teacher violated DOE's rating rules). In this case procedural errors are alleged. As discussed above, there is no doubt that an adverse rating affects Petitioner's substantial rights. Kolmel, 88 A.D.3d at 529 (deficiencies in the review process leading to adverse employment consequences "are not merely technical, but undermine[] the integrity and fairness of the process"). Accordingly Petitioner's allegations that the BOE failed to follow its own procedures relating to documentation supporting Gehlaut's adverse rating and its affirmance on appeal states a cause of action.

Respondents urge this Court to follow its holding in Applewhite v. Board of Educ., 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3995 (Aug. 10, 2012), and reject any procedural requirement outlined in the Ratings Handbook. They refer to this Court's statement in Applewhite that "[v]iolations of the Rating Handbook do not equate to violations of rules or regulations guaranteeing a substantial right, and, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for a finding that the decision to deny petitioner's appeal was made in violation of lawful procedures." After consideration of the arguments in this case I decline to adopt the reasoning of Applewhite here. Dismissing the Ratings Handbook as a mere guideline would be improper in the context of this case. Not only does the hearing officer's ruling excluding any documentation offered at hearing distinguish this case factually from Applewhite, but also Petitioner has established that the Rating Handbook must be equated with administrative rules and regulations that affect a substantial right of the Petitioner. An adverse rating profoundly affects a teacher's professional standing. Various sections of the New York State Commissioner of Education's Regulations and the Chancellor's Special Circular require the existence of procedures outlined in the Handbook and defined nowhere else. Without reference to the Ratings Handbook, Respondents would be in violation of their own regulations. Applewhite can be further distinguished. In that case this Court had six admitted documents before it in sustaining the appeal. See In re Cohn v. Board of Educ., 2013 NY Slip Op 00418 (1st Dep't, Jan. 29, 2013) (affirming adverse rating that was supported by documented observations). Here, in contrast, Petitioner alleges there were none. The Petitioner has stated a cause of action. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Respondents' cross-motion to dismiss the petition is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that within thirty days from the date of service of this order with notice of entry the Respondents shall file a verified answer to the Petition.


Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Murray v NYC DOE: Probationary Teacher Gets Her U-rating Overturned Because The Principal Deprived Her of Her Substantial Rights in the Review Process

Yes, a probationary teacher can win in Court. Juanita Murray, with the help of NYSUT Attorney Eric Chen, got her U-rating overturned by the First Department Appellate Division because the principal made many procedural and contractual errors which showed bad faith.

The Judges wrote,

"The record is clear that petitioner was deprived of her substantial rights in the review process culminating in her U-rating."

Betsy Combier
betsy.combier@gmail.com


Matter of Murray v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y.
2015 NY Slip Op 06866 [131 AD3d 861]
September 22, 2015
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, November 4, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Juanita Murray, Appellant,
v
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York et al., Respondents.
Richard E. Casagrande, New York, (Eric W. Chen of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, (Fay Ng of counsel), for respondents.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alexander W. Hunter, Jr., J.), entered October 1, 2013, denying the petition seeking, inter alia, to annul respondents' determination, dated September 19, 2012, which denied petitioner's appeal of an unsatisfactory rating (U-rating) for the 2010-2011 school year, and granting respondents' motion to dismiss the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the petition granted to the extent of annulling the U-rating.
Petitioner is a tenured school social worker employed by the Department of Education (DOE) (sued here as the Board of Education). She challenges a year-end overall U-rating issued by her principal, Robert Mercedes, in her Annual Professional Performance Review (APPR) for the 2010-2011 school year. The APPR, which she received on June 21, 2011, indicated unsatisfactory ratings in seven categories: attendance and punctuality, where Mercedes indicated that petitioner's attendance was "nearing limit"; professional attitude and professional growth, where he indicated that she lacked professional growth based on observation; resourcefulness and initiative, where he wrote that she lacked initiative and growth; analysis and interpretation of assessment data, where he indicated that she was unable to provide information upon which to base progress; translates assessment findings into educationally relevant goals and objectives, where he wrote that she was unable to assist students served; appropriateness and flexibility of counseling approaches, where he wrote that she was not flexible; and assessment reports, where he wrote that assessment reports were not submitted on time.
The documentation accompanying the APPR consisted of three letters written by Principal Mercedes to petitioner. The first, a May 31, 2011 letter, noted that petitioner had not provided Mercedes with previously requested particularized information concerning her work with, and the progress of, three of her students selected as a sample. The second, a June 7, 2011 letter, indicated that the documentation she subsequently submitted was unsatisfactory. The third, a June 15, 2011 letter, detailed the information previously requested and what petitioner had provided, and requested details of her specific strategies to improve her students' coping skills, the interventions she used that could be "qualitatively analyzed," and evidence that she conferenced with teachers and measured and tracked the success of her students. The June 15, 2011 letter concluded that because the documentation she provided was intended to be used "in lieu of a formal observation" (as had been set forth in a letter of May 10, 2011 included in the record on appeal but not as an attachment to the APPR), she would receive an unsatisfactory evaluation.
As was her right under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, petitioner appealed her U-rating to the Chancellor of the DOE. A hearing took place in May 2012, at which both petitioner and Principal Mercedes testified. No transcript is included in the record; respondents instead rely on the report of the hearing issued by the Chancellor's Committee, which described the parties' arguments, made findings of fact, and recommended that the U-rating be sustained. [*2]The Committee concluded that petitioner had not countered respondents' claims that she took nine absences, all of which were before or after weekends and holidays, that she had been told at the beginning of the year that she was responsible for submitting logs but had not submitted any, that Principal Mercedes was unable to determine what techniques and strategies she was using or how often she met with any of the students, and that her claim that her work had been favorably reviewed by an in-discipline supervisor during the year was "hearsay," as she provided no documentary substantiation. The Committee also noted that the principal was accountable for evaluating all pedagogues in a school.
By letter dated September 19, 2012, petitioner was notified that the U-rating was sustained "as a consequence of a pattern of excessive absence (before and after weekends and holidays), and a lack of impact on student growth."
Pursuant to CPLR 7804, petitioner timely commenced this proceeding. Because she challenges the entirety of the U-rating, there was no need for her to have first filed a grievance based on her unsatisfactory rating for attendance and punctuality. The appeal to the Chancellor's Committee was her exclusive contractual and administrative remedy.
Petitioner establishes that in evaluating her performance, respondents did not adhere to their procedures or those provided in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Special Circular No. 45, a memorandum issued by respondents in response to the mandate set forth in Commissioner of Education Regulations (8 NYCRR) § 100.2 (o), outlines the procedures for rating professional personnel, as does the related manual produced by the New York City Public Schools, entitled Rating Pedagogical Staff Members. Specifically, as a pedagogical employee, petitioner was to be given at least one full period of review during the school year by her principal, followed by a meeting with the principal to discuss her strengths and any areas in need of improvement. Additionally, as a social worker employed at a school, she should have been evaluated by the school principal in consultation with the in-discipline supervisor, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement.
Respondents point to Principal Mercedes' May 15, 2013 affidavit wherein he states that he had in fact observed a group counseling session conducted by petitioner in April 2011 but felt that a single observation was insufficient to gauge the effectiveness of her work. However, he apparently he did not testify about the April observation at the Chancellor's Committee hearing, and petitioner disputes that it occurred. There is no documentation of the April observation, and Mercedes makes no claim to have spoken with petitioner following that observation.
It is also of great concern that an in-discipline supervisor did not critique petitioner's work as required by the collective bargaining agreement. Because there is no transcript of the Chancellor's Committee hearing, we have only petitioner's assertions, made in her underlying papers and again on appeal, that Principal Mercedes admitted to not having the experience or qualifications to evaluate petitioner without input from the in-discipline supervisor prior to asking petitioner for documents.[FN1] Mercedes' May 15, 2013 affidavit offers the additional [*3]statement, made in response to petitioner's claim that he did not collaborate with the in-discipline supervisor when making his year-end evaluation, that the supervisor position for his school was dissolved "after May 2010." There is nothing in the record to substantiate this claim. Presumably such a decision would have been made by persons with more authority than the principal. Moreover, such an action seemingly contradicts the provision in the collective bargaining agreement. In any event, left unstated is that it appears on the record that Mercedes apparently had never conferred with the in-discipline supervisor about petitioner's work prior to the dissolution of the supervisor's position.
There is no evidence that petitioner was notified before the end of the school year in June 2011 that her work was considered unsatisfactory. Although Principal Mercedes testified at the Chancellor's Committee hearing that petitioner was told to keep and be prepared to submit logs of her work, and that she always stated that they were unavailable, there is no indication that she was advised that this was unacceptable and would result in an unsatisfactory evaluation. Mercedes testified that teachers complained they were unable to discuss their students with petitioner, but there is nothing to show petitioner was aware of that criticism prior to the annual performance review, or that she was directed to change her practices. Petitioner was also apparently not cautioned about her absences prior to June 2011, as the only letter sent to her concerning her attendance, oddly not included as part of the APPR, is dated June 2011.
The record is clear that petitioner was deprived of her substantial rights in the review process culminating in her U-rating, when compared with, for instance, Matter of Cohn v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. (102 AD3d 586 [1st Dept 2013]). In Cohn, the petitioner's second annual U-rating was based on "detailed observations in reports prepared by the principal and two assistant principals, describing petitioner's poor performance in class management, engagement of students, and lesson planning" (102 AD3d at 586). He had been provided with a professional development plan at the start of the school year, and he received professional support throughout the year, including several classroom observations by the principal and two assistant principals, all of whom gave "detailed" letters making specific recommendations to improve his instructional deficiencies (id. at 587). Thus, although the petitioner in Cohn did not receive pre-observation conferences before every classroom observation, as required by the collective bargaining agreement and respondents' manual, Rating Pedagogical Staff Members, the U-rating was rationally based. In comparison, the instant record does not show that petitioner was provided with support, or formal constructive criticism, of any kind.
This case also differs from Matter of Richards v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. (117 AD3d 605 [1st Dept 2014]), where we found no violation of a lawful procedure or substantial right despite the probationary teacher's arguments that she did not receive any mandatory prescreening conferences before classroom observations, was not provided a curriculum or a professional development plan, did not receive help to manage disciplinary problems in class, and did not receive model lesson plans from another teacher (id. at 606). However, the record showed that the petitioner was given three formal observation reports describing her poor performance in class management and engagement of students, and was sent to professional development sessions after receiving her first unsatisfactory report, but her [*4]instructional skills did not improve (id. at 606-607). In contrast, here respondents have not demonstrated by competent proof that they gave petitioner, who was tenured, any feedback of any kind.
The facts alleged here are more akin to those in Matter of Kolmel v City of New York (88 AD3d 527, 527-529 [1st Dept 2011]), where the U-rating given to the probationary teacher in his fourth year of teaching was arbitrary and without a rational basis because the principal who awarded the U-rating did not observe the petitioner's teaching during either of his last two years at the school, and because the year-end report indicated that all but two categories were unsatisfactory even when there was no evidence to support the rating, or the rating was contradicted by evidence in the report.[FN2] In Matter of Kolmel, the respondents' failure to adhere to the regulations tainted the findings of two negative classroom observations cited in the year-end report, two file letters claiming unbecoming conduct, and the year-end U-rating (id.).
Similarly, in Matter of Brown v City of New York (111 AD3d 426, 427 [1st Dept 2013]), we held that the deficiencies in rating the petitioner "undermined the integrity and fairness of the entire review process." There, the petitioner, in her second year, was observed by the principal, informally and for the first time, at the end of January and was criticized for failing to have a daily plan. She was formally observed about a month later and, although found deficient in other areas, was not provided with the written evaluation until early June; nine days after receiving the formal evaluation, she was formally evaluated for a second time and found, unsurprisingly, to have made no improvement.
In short, the complete absence of constructive criticism and warnings during the entire school year, compounded by the lack of a formal observation and accompanying feedback during the school year, "undermined the integrity and fairness of the process" (Matter of Kolmel, 88 AD3d at 529). Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed, and the petition granted to the extent of annulling the U-rating. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Feinman and Clark, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2013 NY Slip Op 32292(U).]
Footnotes


Footnote 1:Respondents cite Batyreva v New York City Dept. of Educ. (50 AD3d 283 [1st Dept 2008]), to argue that the Board of Education is not required to include a transcript of a Chancellor's Committee hearing when a proceeding is commenced under CPLR 7803 (3). Batyreva addressed whether that particular proceeding should have been brought pursuant to CPLR 7803 (4), requiring a substantial evidence analysis, and concluded that it was properly brought under the arbitrary and capricious standard (CPLR 7803 [3]). As to the hearing transcript, which had not been included in the record, we noted that the petitioner had not "demonstrated that a full transcript of the hearing before the Chancellor's Committee . . . was unavailable upon request" (Batyreva at 283-284). However, the evidence in Batyreva included eleven unsatisfactory classroom evaluation reports over the course of two years, and there was no question that the administrative decision to uphold the U-ratings was not arbitrary and capricious. Here, in contrast, while respondents have provided a litany of petitioner's failings, the issue is whether petitioner had notice of the complaints, or was in essence blindsided at the end of the school year. The hearing transcript might have shed some light on this question, as well as on the issue of Mercedes's alleged admission that he lacked the competence to evaluate social workers. 

Footnote 2:Additionally, the principal had stated at the administrative hearing that she did not rely on the file letters in making her tenure recommendation, and the petitioner submitted a statement by a current DOE employee who formerly worked at the high school, that the principal pressured assistant principals to give negative U-ratings without observing the teachers (Kolmelat 528-529).