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Saturday, June 9, 2012

First Department Approves Charter For Brooklyn Success Academy 3 in District 15


Matter of Norris v Walcott
2012 NY Slip Op 22151
Decided on May 29, 2012
Supreme Court, New York County
Moulton, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 29, 2012 
Supreme Court, New York County


In the Matter of Melinda Norris, et al., Petitioners, Pursuant to Article 78, 

against

Dennis Walcott, in his Official Capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Board of Education; The Board of Trustees of the State University of New York; and Brooklyn Success Academy 3 Charter School, Respondents.



10510/12 

Peter H. Moulton, J.

Petitioners in this Article 78 proceeding seek declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the award of a school charter to respondent Brooklyn Success Academy 3 ("BSA 3"). Petitioners are parents of students who attend public schools in Community School District 15, the district where BSA 3 has been sited by the City's Department of Education ("DOE"). A number of petitioners have children in schools housed in the school building denominated K293, the building where the DOE has decided to "co-locate" BSA 3 with other schools.
It is undisputed that BSA 3's application for a charter indicated that it was seeking to place the school in Community School Districts 13 or 14, and that, after the issuance of the charter, the City's Department of Education gave the school space in Community School District 15. The three districts abut each other in Brooklyn.
Petitioners argue that this move to another Community School District requires a revision of BSA 3's charter.
However, petitioners' primary claim as stated in their proposed amended petition is that the Education Law mandates community input before a charter school may be approved. Petitioners assert that true community input for BSA 3 was not sought by BSA 3's parent organization. According to petitioners respondent Trustees of the State University of New York ("SUNY Trustees") blindly accepted BSA 3's representations 1) that it had performed conscientious community outreach, and 2) that this outreach showed that the relevant community was [*2]overwhelmingly supportive of the school. Petitioners characterize BSA 3's community outreach as feeble, bordering on a sham, and argue that the SUNY Trustees should have rejected the charter application on that ground.
As a threshold matter, respondent BSA 3 argues that petitioners do not have standing because they have failed to demonstrate any injury in fact that places them within the zone of interests protected by the Education Law. Petitioners respond that the Educational Impact Statement concerning BSA 3's co-location with other schools in Building K293 show that co-location will cause the building to reach 107% capacity in the 2014-15 school year. They also argue that they are part of the community that was allegedly ignored by BSA 3's outreach efforts, and that they were harmed by the failure of BSA 3 and the SUNY Trustees to take their views into account. BSA 3 also claims that petitioners' claims are time-barred.
On the merits, respondents argue that BSA 3's application materials showed more than sufficient community outreach and support for the school. Respondents argue that the siting of BSA 3 in Community School District 15 was caused by space constraints in school buildings in Community School Districts 13 and 14, and that no further amendment to the charter is required by law or regulation for this move to an adjacent community school district in the same borough.
Before the court are the following:
1) petitioners' original petition and the respondents' answers and various objections in point of law;
2) the intervention motion of various parents who wish to enter the lottery for BSA 3. The interveners are allied in interest with BSA 3 and are represented by the same counsel; and
3) petitioners' motion to file an amended petition and respondents' opposition to the motion. 
BACKGROUND
The sequence of events that led to the issuance of a charter to BSA 3 is not in dispute and is summarized below.
On January 3, 2011, the Charter Schools Institute ("Institute"), an arm of The State University of New York ("SUNY), issued a request for proposals for 63 new charter schools in the state. The Institute serves as staff to the SUNY Trustees on matters pertaining to charter schools.
On February 28, 2011, BSA 3 submitted a joint application with two other schools, Brooklyn Success Academies 2 and 4, concerning proposed charter schools for Community School Districts 13 and 14. All three charter schools are managed by Success Academy Charter Schools ("Success Academy") a non-profit education organization that operates a network of charter schools in New York City. The application made a number of representations concerning outreach conducted by Success Academy to parents, office holders, and other stakeholders in Community School Districts 13 and 14. It attached over 1500 petitions for each of the three schools.
On May 26, 2011, respondent Dennis Walcott, Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, recommended to the Institute that the charters for BSA 2-4 be granted. Chancellor Walcott also noted that there might not be room for all three schools in Community School Districts 13 and 14, and raised the possibility that one or more of the schools might have to be sited in "other contiguous districts."
On June 5, 2011, the Institute recommended the three schools for approval. The SUNY [*3]Trustees voted to approve the charters on June 15, 2011. On June 27, 2011, the SUNY Trustees posted on its website a notice of its approval. The SUNY Trustees issued provisional charters to the three schools on August 11, 2011. The Board of Regents approved the charters on September 13, 2011. As of that date, none of the schools had been assigned to a specific building. Thereafter, the Board of Regents posted online minutes from the meeting in which BSA 3's charter was approved.
On October 28, 2011, the Department of Education issued a public notice proposing to locate BSA 3 in building K293 in Community School District 15. Three schools currently occupy the building. The notice contained a link to the Educational Impact Statement, and also provided information concerning a public hearing on November 29, 2011, at which DOE's Panel for Educational Policy ("PEP") would take public input regarding the co-location of BSA 3 with the other three schools. The meeting went forward. Among the speakers and attendees at the meeting were parents of elementary school-aged children, elected officials, members of the Community Education Council, members of the School Leadership Team, and teachers.
On December 14, 2011, the DOE's governing body, the Panel on Educational Policy, voted to approve the co-location of BSA 3 at building K293 in Community School District 15. On January 25, 2012, the SUNY Trustees found that this decision was outside of its purview and did not require an amendment to BSA 3's charter. Petitioners assert that they subsequently attempted to appeal this decision, without success, to H. Carl McCall, the Chairman of the SUNY Trustees. 
DISCUSSION
A.Petitioners' Motion to Amend the Petition
After oral argument on the original petition, and after the court had worked out a briefing schedule with the parties, petitioners moved to amend the petition. The proposed amended petition retains the claim in the original petition: that Education Law § 2852(7) requires that BSA 3 revise its charter before it can be sited in a Community School District other than the districts discussed in its charter application. However, the amended petition adds claims under Education Law §§ 2851(2)(q) and 2852(9-a)(b)(ii). In these new claims, petitioners assert that respondent SUNY Trustees unlawfully approved BSA 3's charter despite Success Academy's failure to seek true community input concerning BSA 3.
Leave to amend a pleading shall be "freely given" unless the proposed new claims are clearly without merit or the opposing parties can demonstrate prejudice or surprise. (CPLR 3025; see 

Anoun v City of New York, 85 AD3d 694 [1st Dept 2011]; Eighth Ave. Garage Corp. v H.K.L Realty Corp., 60 AD3d 404 [1st Dept 2009].)
The proposed new claims are not clearly without merit. They are based in specific sections of the Education Law and supported by facts set forth in the initial petition. There are few new facts alleged in the amended petition, and only one additional exhibit. Respondents have made no colorable claim of prejudice. The new claims are foreshadowed by the facts alleged in the initial petition. The claims mirror those asserted by another Article 78 proceeding naming the same respondents, challenging BSA 3's sister school, BSA 4. (Southside Community Schools Coalition v Brooklyn Success Academy 4 Charter School, Index No. 102054/12.)
Accordingly, the motion to amend the petition is granted.
B.Motion to Intervene [*4]
Intervener respondents are parents who reside in Community School District 15 who wish to send their children to BSA 3. Admission to the school will be by lottery, so at the time the motion was brought, none of the proposed interveners could be assured that they will be granted admission. There has been no indication from proposed interveners whether any of their children were subsequently admitted to BSA 3 since the date that the motion was fully submitted.
Petitioners oppose the intervention motion. They point out that proposed intervener respondents have not submitted a proposed answer to the petition. Petitioners also argue that the interveners have no right to attend BSA 3 and that they might not gain entrance via the lottery. Accordingly, petitioners argue, the proposed interveners are not "interested persons" who could be harmed by any delay in the school's opening. Finally, petitioners argue that the interveners have no cognizable defense in this Article 78 proceeding, which is a challenge to allegedly arbitrary and capricious or illegal agency action. The interveners do not share any defense with the SUNY Trustees, the DOE, or BSA 3, because the proposed interveners are individuals — not administrative agencies that must justify challenged action.
CPLR 7802(d) states that a court "may allow other interested persons to intervene in an Article 78 proceeding." A court has broader authority to allow intervention in an Article 78 proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7802(d) than it does in action pursuant to CPLR 1013, (See Greater Health Care Facilities Assn. v DeBuono, 91 NY2d 716 [1998]; Kruger v Bloomberg, 1 Misc 3d 192 [2003]; 14 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, New York Civil Practice, ¶ 7802.05.)
The proposed interveners' failure to provide a pleading is not fatal. Their positions are aligned with BSA 3's. They set forth their interest in their affidavits. Nothing more is required. (See Steglich v Bd. of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of New York, 32 Misc 3d 1203[A] [2011].)
Petitioners are correct that respondents' decision to grant BSA 3 a charter will stand or fall depending on whether respondent SUNY Trustees properly found that BSA 3 conducted sufficient community outreach before submitting its application, and on whether respondents properly allowed the siting of BSA 3 in Community School District 15. If respondents cannot demonstrate these actions were rational and in compliance with law, it does not matter that interveners wish to send their children to BSA 3.
On the other hand it is clear that the proposed interveners are interested in the timely opening of BSA 3. Even if their interest is contingent before the results of the lottery are known, these interveners seek to give voice to the desires of parents who seek to send their children to BSA 3. Therefore, they put a human face to the bureaucratic decision-making that is at issue in this case. The Education Law requires a charter school applicant like Success Academy to seek input from stakeholders in the relevant community. (Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b).) No less than the petitioners, the proposed interveners are stakeholders. Accordingly, the motion to intervene is granted.
C.Threshold Defenses
The respondents raise two threshold defenses: lack of standing and statute of limitations.
1.Standing
BSA 3 challenges petitioners' standing to bring this Article 78 proceeding. It argues that [*5]petitioners have articulated no harm to them if the school opens. Therefore, BSA 3 argues, petitioners can state no injury in fact. BSA 3 also argues that petitioners are not within the "zone of interests" protected by the Education Law sections invoked by petitioners.
"[A] party has standing to enforce a statutory right if its abuse will cause him injury and it may fall within the zone of interests' protected by the legislation." (Schwartz v Morgenthau, 7 NY3d 427, 432 [2006], quoting Matter of District Attorney of Suffolk County, 58 NY2d 436, 442 [1983].)
Respondents are correct that petitioners have no standing under Education Law § 2852(7)(b). That provision states:
When a revision of a charter involves the relocation of a charter school to a different school district, the proposed new school district shall be given at least forty-five days notice of the proposed relocation. In addition, the applicant shall provide an analysis of the community support for such relocation and of the projected programmatic and fiscal impact of the charter school on the proposed new school district of location and other public and nonpublic schools in the area.
Petitioners assert that the BSA 3's application stated that it was to be sited in Community School Districts 13 or 14, and that the SUNY Trustees granted the charter on that basis. Therefore, petitioners argue, the placement of BSA 3 in Community School District 15 requires that Success Academy undertake an analysis of "community support" in District 15. Petitioners state they are members of the relevant community.
This argument fails because Education Law § 2852(7)(b) refers to a new "school district" not a new "community school district." The School District of the City of New York encompasses all five boroughs. Section 2590-a of the Education Law defines "community districts" within the "city school district" of the City of New York. These districts are commonly called community school districts. When the Education Law means to specify a "community district" — as opposed to a school district — in the Education Law, it does so explicitly. For example, such a distinction is made in Education Law § 2854(2)(b).
The possibility that BSA 3 might be sited in a Community School District other than 13 or 14 is contemplated in its charter. The charter allows BSA 3 to be sited anywhere in Brooklyn, so long as the SUNY Trustees do not expressly disapprove the move.
Accordingly, as petitioners are not part of a "community" in a new school district within the meaning of Education Law § 2852(7)(b), they do not have standing under that section to challenge respondents' failure to require a new analysis of community support and a revision of BSA 3's charter.
Petitioners also invoke Education Law §§ 2851(2)(q), 2852(9-a)(b). According to petitioners these two provisions of the Education Law mandate that any charter school applicant gauge community support and opposition to a charter school, and assess the impact of a charter school on other schools in a given area. Petitioners argue that they were "silenced" by BSA 3's failure to properly solicit views of their community.
Education Law § 2851(2)(q) provides that a charter school applicant must provide:
Evidence of adequate community support for and interest in the charter school sufficient to allow the school to reach its anticipated enrollment, and an assessment of the projected programmatic and fiscal impact of the school on other public and nonpublic schools in the area. [*6]
This section contains two clauses. The first clause requires charter school applicants to gauge "adequate community support" to determine if the school can "reach its anticipated enrollment." This portion of the statute requires evidence of supportfor the school. Accordingly, petitioners — who are opposed to BSA 3 — are not within the zone of interests protected by this portion of the statute. As long as there is sufficient evidence of support — it does not matter what petitioners' views are.
In its second clause, the statute does not explicitly require respondents to consider the views of community residents in assessing "the projected programmatic and fiscal impact of the school on other public and nonpublic schools in the area." Respondents are directed to consider "the projected programmatic and fiscal impact of the school on other public and nonpublic schools in the area" but the statute does not direct respondents to any particular source of information. Petitioners allege that they are concerned about a diversion of resources, including school space, away from standard public schools and towards BSA 3. They allege that their views, and those of other opponents of BSA 3, were ignored by BSA 3. However, by its terms, § 2851(2)(q) does not confer standing on petitioners to raise this claim.
Petitioners state a similar claim under Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b). That section states in relevant part:
The board of regents and the board of trustees of the state university of New York shall each develop such request for proposals in a manner that facilitates a thoughtful review of charter school applications, considers the demand for charter schools by the community, and seeks to locate charter schools in a region or regions where there may be a lack of alternatives and access to charter schools would provide new alternatives within the local public education system that would offer the greatest educational benefit to students. Applications shall be evaluated in accordance with the criteria and objectives contained within a request for proposals. The board of regents and the board of trustees of the state university of New York shall not consider any applications which do not rigorously demonstrate that they have met the following criteria: 
***
(ii) that the applicant has conducted public outreach, in conformity with a thorough and meaningful public review process prescribed by the board of regents and the board of trustees of the state university of New York, to solicit community input regarding the proposed charter school and to address comments received from the impacted community concerning the educational and programmatic needs of students.
Petitioners have standing under this section. "Community" is not a defined term in the Education Law. However, if this section concerning "community input" is to have any meaning, it must refer to input from residents of the very City neighborhood in which the charter school is to be sited, and from parents who send their children to the very school building where the charter school will be housed. Such people are the nucleus of the affected "community," however broadly that term is defined.
2.Statute of Limitations
As held above, the only statute under which petitioners have standing is Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b). The applicable limitations period for this Article 78 proceeding is four months. (CPLR [*7]217). The parties disagree concerning the date that the four month period began to accrue.
Respondents assert that petitioners' claims are barred because they were not brought until eight months after the SUNY Trustees approved BSA 3's charter on June 15, 2011. At the latest, respondents argue, the accrual date is the date that the decision was published on the website of the SUNY Charter Schools Institute, which was June 27, 2011. If either June 2011 date is the correct accrual date the petitioners' remaining claim is time-barred.
For their part, petitioners argue that the relevant accrual date is October 28, 2011, when the Department of Education first issued a public notice proposing to locate BSA 3 in building K293 in Community School District 15. According to petitioners it was at that point that they suffered their alleged injury, an injury that arose from respondents failing to solicit their views opposing BSA 3. Implicit in petitioners' argument is that the relevant "community" from which the SUNY Trustees were required to seek "input" is the community school district in which the school is to be sited. Until the school was sited, the argument goes, there was no "community" that could suffer an injury. Since this action was filed on February 14, 2012, the proceeding is timely if it accrued on October 28, 2011.
A petitioner may challenge an administrative decision pursuant to Article 78 when it is final and binding. (CPLR 217[1].) The accrual date for limitations purposes is often hotly disputed in Article 78 proceedings. It can be particularly difficult to determine the accrual date where, as is the case here, the petitioners were not parties to the challenged administrative decision and were not entitled to personal notice of the final decision. It is further complicated, as is the case here, where there is more than one administrative decision maker. The Court of Appeals has provided a two step inquiry that aids courts' analysis in such cases.
First the agency must have reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury and second, the injury inflicted may not be prevented or significantly ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party. 

(Matter of Best Payphones, Inc. v Dep't of Information Technology and Telecom. of the City of New York, 5 NY3d 30, 34 [2005].)
Additionally, petitioners must have some notice of the administrative decision they wish to challenge. (Metropolitan Museum Historic Dist. Coalition v De Montebello, 20 AD3d 28 [2005].) Public notice can come in a variety of forms, including public meeting (see Branch v Riverside Park Community LLC, 74 AD3d 634 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710) or publication on the agency's website (see Town of Olive v City of New York, 63 AD3d 1416 [3rd Dept 2009]).
The timing of the alleged injury on petitioners in this proceeding is not straightforward. As noted above, petitioners assert that they suffered an injury when they discovered that the SUNY Trustees would allow the placement of BSA 3 in Community School District 15 without requiring sufficient outreach in Community School District 15. However, the statute invoked by petitioners, Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b)(ii), uses the term "community," it does not use the terms "community school district" or "community district." The "community" to be solicited under that section is thus broader than Community School District 15. Therefore the injury did not occur when the school was first proposed for Community School District 15.
Petitioners do not wish simply to speak against BSA 3; they seek to void its charter and keep it from opening. It is true that petitioners call for a vetting process that they say would reveal [*8]overwhelming community opposition to the school. But they seek such a vetting process for the purpose of convincing the SUNY Trustees that the school should not open at all. In their prayer for relief, petitioners seek an injunction that would permanently enjoin "respondent Brooklyn Success Academy 3 Charter School from opening, operating and maintaining [BSA 3] in School District 15 or any other community school district." (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, the administrative action that allegedly inflicted harm on petitioners was the decision to allow BSA 3 to open. At first glance, the relevant decision would appear to be the decision to grant BSA 3's charter. This would appear to support respondents' argument that the relevant date for accrual of the four month limitations period is June 15, 2011, the day the SUNY Trustees voted to approve the charter.
However, as set forth in the Background section above, there was more administrative action after the June 15 vote. The final gatekeeper appears to have been the Board of Regents, an entity separate from the SUNY Trustees. The Board of Regents is not a party to this proceeding.
Pursuant to Education Law § 2852(5) the "charter entity," here, the SUNY Trustees, had to submit the proposed Charter Agreement to the Board of Regents for review. While the Board of Regents cannot reject the proposed charter, they are empowered to either approve the charter or to return the charter to the charter entity with comments for reconsideration. If the charter is returned the charter entity, the charter entity must consider the Board of Regents' comments.
Thereafter, the charter entity shall resubmit the proposed charter to the board of regents with modifications, provided that the applicant consents in writing to such modifications, resubmit the proposed charter to the board of regents without modifications, or abandon the proposed charter. 

(Education Law § 2852[5-b].)
These sections of the Education Law contemplate an iterative process, short in duration, between the SUNY Trustees and the Board of Regents. While the Regents cannot reject a charter, under Education Law § 2852(5-b) their returning the charter to the charter entity (here the SUNY Trustees) can result in the charter entity abandoning the proposed charter. Therefore, the decision to grant a charter is not truly final until one of three events occurs: 1) the Regents approve a proposed charter, 2) the Regents take no action on a proposed charter for ninety days, in which case the charter is "deemed" approved (Education Law 2852(5-a); or 3) the charter entity (here the SUNY Trustees) resubmits the charter application to the Regents, at which point the Regents' approval is essentially a rubber stamp, with no further power to delay or alter the application.
BSA 3's charter became final under the first of the above scenarios. The operative date is September 13, 2011, the date the Board of Regents voted to approve BSA 3's charter. At that point, there was no further possibility that the charter might be abandoned by the SUNY Trustees.
The final question is: when did the Board of Regents or the respondents give notice of this final and binding decision? It appears that the Board of Regents' approval was publicly announced on the Regents' website on October 4, 2011.[FN1]Particularly as it came after a long public decision-[*9]making process, this notification was sufficient. (See Town of Olive v City of New York, 63 AD3d 1416, supra; Johns v Rampe, 23 AD3d 283 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 715 [2006]; Matter of Cohen v State of New York, 2 AD3d 522 [2d Dept 2003].) As this notice occurred more than four months prior to the date the initial petition was filed, this proceeding is time-barred.
Petitioners rely on Mulgrew v Bd. of Educ. of the School Dist. of the City of New York, (28 Misc 3d 204 [Sup Ct, New York County, aff'd 75 AD3d 412 [1st Dept 2010) in arguing that publication of a final decision on a website is insufficient. However, in Mulgrew the respondents did not adhere to a specific statutory requirements for filing educational impact statements. There is no similar statute here that requires a particular method of publicizing the Board of Regents' decision to the general public.[FN2]
For the reasons stated, this proceeding is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
D.The Amended Petition
Even if this proceeding was not time-barred, on the merits respondents have demonstrated that the decision to grant a charter to BSA 3 was not arbitrary or capricious or in violation of Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b), the only statute that confers standing on petitioners.
Petitioners argue that Success Academy's community outreach was essentially a walk through a Potemkin Village of parents eager to send their children to BSA 3. According to petitioners, Success Academy falsely stated that there was no opposition to the school, when in fact such opposition was stated at a meeting with school representatives on April 14, 2011. Further, overwhelming opposition would have been expressed, petitioners imply, if only Success Academy had sought to conduct true community outreach in the relevant portions of Brooklyn that would be served by BSA 3. Instead, petitioners assert, BSA 3 conducted "community outreach" that was calculated to obscure the level of community opposition.
Petitioners correctly note that BSA 3's charter application does not address some of the suggestions of the guidelines that accompany the SUNY Trustees' request for proposals ("RFP"). The guidelines for the RFP seek "explicit support" for the proposed school from "community stakeholders or others" and state that "generic support for charter schools ... is not sufficient." Petitioners fault BSA 3 for invoking support for its existing schools, located elsewhere in the City, as having nothing to do with support for BSA 3. Petitioners also argue that Success Academy's petitions, which were signed by 4500 people, were too generic to provide any useful evidence that the relevant communities in Brooklyn were interested in the type of schools that Success Academy was planning. The petitions do not contain information suggested by the instructions for the RFP, [*10]such as whether the signatory has school-age children. Petitioners note that a number of signatures are from individuals who reside outside of Community School District 15. However, petitioners do not quantify this number. In any event, as noted above, the relevant "community" from which input must be solicited is greater than Community School District 15.
Petitioners correctly argue that the instructions for the RFP elaborate on section 2852(9-a)(b)(ii)'s requirement of community input. The instructions for the RFP include the following:
Per Education Law subdivision 2852(9-a)(b)(ii) the SUNY Trustees are not to consider any proposal that does not reflect a meaningful public review process designed to solicit community input regarding the proposed charter school and address comments received from the impacted community concerning the educational and programmatic needs of students. In order to recommend a school for approval, the [charter school application must demonstrate (1) the community was informed of the proposed school in a timely fashion; (2) the community had meaningful opportunities for input; and (3) there was a thoughtful process for considering community feedback and incorporating it into the final proposal.
Please note that seeking input about the proposal is distinct from seeking support for the proposed school. While the application must also show evidence of community interest in and support for the school, this support alone is not adequate in demonstrating that the community was given the opportunity to provide input into the design of the proposed school and that input was carefully considered by the applicant.
Petitioners state that Success Academy flouted this provision by failing to discuss in its proposal a single concern about the proposed school in the "impacted community." There does not appear to have been any input solicited concerning the "design" of the school.
Petitioners are correct that Success Academy could have engaged in a more thorough-going canvas of the relevant neighborhoods in Brooklyn to surface concerns and opposition to BSA 3. However, the statute does not require that charter applicants conduct such an exhaustive survey of support and opposition.
The community outreach required by the statute is weak. In the first place, as described above, the word "community" is not defined. This fact leaves to the SUNY Trustees a great deal of discretion in determining whose views must be taken into account. Additionally, the statute requires community input on the "educational and programmatic needs of students" without in any way suggesting how to solicit, organize or record such input. Finally, the statute does not bar the issuance of a charter even where the relevant community, however defined, mounts serious or even overwhelming opposition to a proposed school during the course of the public input required by Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b). Where the legislature wishes to create a more detailed process for community involvement in schools-related decision making, it has done so. The statute governing school co-location is an example. (See Education Law § 2853[3].)
It was not arbitrary and capricious for the SUNY Trustees to find that Success Academy complied with the community input requirements of Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b). The petitions, though they do not provide much detail about the nature of BSA 3, provide some evidence of interest. The application also recounts Success Academy's correspondence sent to elected officials and other interested parties in the area concerning plans to open the school. Success Academy [*11]officials attended community meetings with the community boards that serve the relevant communities, and the Education Councils for Districts 13 and 14. The SUNY Trustees are afforded deference in interpreting the Education Law provisions governing charter schools. (See Bd. of Educ. Of Riverhead Central Sch. Dist v Board of Regents, 301 AD2d 919; International High School: a Charter School at LaGuardia Community College v Mills, 276 AD2d 165.) The SUNY Trustees could rationally find that the level of community outreach exercised by Success Academy was sufficient to meet the very general requirements of Education Law § 2852(9-a)(b). 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition is denied and this Article 78 proceeding is dismissed. This constitutes the decision and order of the court. 

Date:May 29, 2012______________________
J.S.C.
Footnotes


Footnote 1:The Memorandum accompanying the September 13, 2011 minutes is dated October 4, 2012. This cover memorandum and the minutes are part of the record of the companion case Southside Community Schools Coalition v Brooklyn Success Academy 4 Charter School, Index 102054/12. The memo and the minutes appear on the Regents' website at: www.regents.nysed.gov/meetings/October2011/1101bra2.pdf 

Footnote 2:Education Law § 2857(1) does impose some notification duties on the Board of Regents and the charter entity (SUNY Trustees). That section states in relevant part: "At each significant stage of the chartering process, the charter entity [here, the SUNY Trustees] and the board of regents shall provide appropriate notification to the school district in which the charter school is located and to the public and nonpublic schools in the same geographic area as the proposed charter school." Respondents are not among the groups entitled to notification under this section.

Thursday, June 7, 2012

PERV Teachers Swarm NYC Public Schools - Not

NYC is buzzing with the "37% rise in 2012 complaints of sexual misconduct" (Daily News, below). Mona Davids, a "parents advocate" but actually the spokesperson for the UFT, is quoted saying "It's alarming, its very alarming" to show that the press reports are working. She knows nothing, so she is an excellent person to quote.



PULEEEZ, this is such a false news report, published for political reasons.  Are there people in our city schools who harm children? Yes, unfortunately there are, just as there are priests, politicians, CEOs of major Fortune 500 Companies, etc., etc., who commit crimes against children, and everyone must be held accountable for these horrific acts. But reporters who know nothing and go after an innocent person simply to get policy approved by our legislature is wrong, stupid, annoying, and a thousand other things. A rise in complaints? Yep, there sure are. There HAS to be, in order for the new policy for 3020-a arbitration that does not include "Just Cause" to pass.

I'll give you an example. A teacher with more than 30 years of satisfactory ratings was brought to 3020-a on false charges. Months after the arbitrator cleared him, but, in a politically expedient manner gave a decision to extract a $1500 fine (to pay him, the arbitrator?) for no reason other than he thought that the girl who made the accusation was bothered a little, even though he, the arbitrator did not believe a word she said in her testimony. Then the NY Daily News parked a car outside the teacher's house, and Ben Chapman called him to tell him that they wanted to talk with him and could he please come to the car. He, the teacher, looked out of his window and verified that two men were sitting in a car outside, waiting to take his picture. He called me. What should he do? I suggested that we have a conference call with reporter Chapman. When Chapman got on the telephone, the teacher asked why he was being stalked, and Chapman told him that there would be a story in the paper the next day on how teachers who were accused of sex crimes in the schools of NYC were increasing, and they could not be fired. I said, "Did you know that there was a decision in this case and the arbitrator loved this teacher, found that his teaching record showed he was an excellent teacher, and virtually exonerated him because he believed what this teacher testified to, and did not believe a single witness who testified for the DOE?" Chapman told us, nope, didnt know. Can you get me the decision? I did, a few minutes later.

The next day the teacher's name was published as one of the 16 perverts still teaching. This person's life, career, and family were destroyed all at once, because Chapman was paid to do the story of the infamous 16 teacher-perverts. He had no time to fill the paper with someone other than the teacher his editors decided needed to be fired, even though the arbitrator said no. The teacher is looking to sue.

The strategy used by the rags is clear: first, to bolster the proposed legislation to do away with "Just Cause" in the 3020-a teacher trials so that the Gotcha Squad can fire these pervert teachers (aren't all of them tenured? Aren't most of them getting paid high salaries?); second, to get rid of arbitrators who dare to challenge Bloomberg and Walcott by not firing all employees brought before them at 3020-a arbitration. Ten arbitrators quit recently, so the strategy is working.

Oh - before anyone out there thinks I support a person who really does try to have sex with a minor child in any setting, your thinking is wrong. But as I know how the Gotcha Squad works, and as I know that Mayor Bloomberg began his mayorship on the platform of removing tenure rights from public schools (along with the rights to due process for anyone, for that matter), I dont believe what I read in the rags. Editors and publishers are desperately trying to stay afloat right now, and sex sells. That is no secret.

Fortunately, I have seen the most outrageous stupidity on the part of so-called "investigators" who pretend to look into the cases brought to 3020-a, teacher arbitration. When they get asked 'real' questions, such as, "did you check out the background of the child who made the accusation?" "Did the principal have a problem with the teacher because the teacher filed a grievance/complaint/lawsuit against him/her?" The answer is always "no". The way SCI, OSI, and OEO work is to go to a school, meet with the principal, find out what the principal wants to do with accused teacher X, gather the statements of the children (already made up with the principal), and get the school staff to bring each witness into the principal (or AP)'s office where the "investigator" asks the child, "did you write this? Is this your statement?" The child says yes, and off they go. Simple. The charge is substantiated.


Sexual misconduct cases in city schools are on the rise

Parents advocate calls 37% increase in reported cases an 'alarming' increase

Comments (15)
Updated: Wednesday, June 6, 2012, 4:00 AM

LINK


An upsurge in sexual misconduct allegations is rocking city schools — with more than 150 complaints against staffers in April and May alone, official data show.
The last two months continue the trend of more complaints than in 2011 — a 37% increase over last year’s numbers.
“It’s alarming, it’s very alarming,” said Mona Davids, president of the New York City Parents Union. “We need to start addressing this. We’re seeing the stories in the paper and parents are concerned.”
In the last week alone, there were allegations against two women teachers, including Erin Sayar, an English teacher at James Madison High School, who faces statutory rape charges for allegedly having sex with a 16-year-old student half a dozen times last year.
“Some of the cases have been sort of sensational, so that’s gotten a lot of publicity,” said Special Commissioner of Investigation Richard Condon. “But that doesn’t explain all the other cases that are coming up.”
Overall, the special schools investigator opened 528 misconduct cases in the first five months of this year — 28% more than last year — including 223 cases involving sexual misconduct.
At the same time, Condon’s office has closed 334 cases — a 7% decline since last year.
More school staffers have been arrested so far this year than in all of 2011, according to data from the NYPD, the special schools investigator and news reports. At least 23 Department of Education workers were busted by cops so far this year. In 2011, there were at least 13 arrests.
“I don’t know if in the past [sexual misconduct\] was being covered up or swept under the rugs,” said Chancellor Dennis Walcott, speaking in Albany, where he was lobbying for a new law to give the chancellor instead of arbitrators the final say on firing teachers.
“I think we are giving it much more attention, and one of the things the mayor and I are very clear about is trying to make sure people understand the ramification of these cases.”
United Federation of Teachers president Michael Mulgrew noted yesterday that his union “believes in zero tolerance” on sexual misconduct with children.
“That’s why our contract already includes the toughest penalty in the state — automatic termination — for any teacher found guilty of this offense,” he said in a statement.
Zakiyah Ansari, advocacy director for the Alliance for Quality Education, said proven abusers must be removed promptly from the classroom. “We have to make sure this is about keeping our children safe and nothing else,” she said.
rmonahan@nydailynews.com





Wednesday, June 6, 2012

In Florida A Judge Asks Whether the DOE Exceeded Its Legal Power In Evaluating Teachers

Judge Weighs DOE Handling of Teacher Law

Ten of the twenty-four 3020-a Arbitrators Quit the NYC UFT/DOE Panel



Very much worth reading to see how useless this "agreement" was, and how no one followed it (well, this you cannot tell from just reading it, but I can tell you that it was not adhered to by anyone, UFT/DOE/arbitrators).

Then came the April 15, 2010 "agreement" that no one paid any attention to either. Once in a blue moon an arbitrator would give 20 minutes to prepare for a witness' cross-examination at 3020-a, and I could always tell which way he/she was leaning when the 20-minutes was allocated, and it was not for lunch. See the agreement below.

Then, there were new rules effective April 1, 2012, which changed the way the arbitrators were paid, and guaranteed that none of them would be paid for the time they already spent hearing cases. Infuriated, ten of the 24 arbitrators on the UFT/DOE arbitration panel quit.

What effect this may have is anyone's guess, but one thing is for sure: the arbitrators are hopping mad, and they are not gonna take it anymore.

Stay tuned...

The April 15, 2010 "Close The Rubber Rooms" Agreement

April 15, 2010

Michael Mulgrew, President
United Federation of Teachers
52 Broadway, 14th Floor
New York, New York 10004

Dear Mr. Mulgrew:

This letter will confirm the mutual understandings and agreements between the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (“DOE”) and the United Federation of Teachers (“UFT”).  Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute a waiver or modification of any provision of any collective bargaining agreement, letter (including but not limited to the June 27, 2008 letter from the Chancellor to the President of the UFT) or other agreement between the DOE and the UFT except as specifically set forth herein.  Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to convert non-mandatory subjects of bargaining into mandatory subjects of bargaining.  As used herein, the term “CBA” shall refer to the collective bargaining agreement covering teachers and corresponding provisions of other UFT-DOE collective bargaining agreements.

The long delays that have arisen in the current process of investigating alleged acts of misconduct and adjudicating charges pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a benefit neither the DOE nor the employees represented by the UFT.  The DOE and the UFT are committed to ensuring that the agreements reached here will be carried out so that those delays will be ended and the process outlined in the law, the contracts between the parties, and this Agreement will be adhered to.  

For purposes of this Agreement, all timelines shall be measured in calendar days, but shall not include the summer break, all recess periods and holidays.   

Reassignment

Misconduct Cases (i.e., any case deemed by the DOE to deal exclusively or primarily with an employee’s behavior, not his or her pedagogy):  Pending investigation of possible misconduct and completion of the § 3020-a hearing, the DOE may reassign an employee only to (i) a DOE administrative office to do work consistent with law (an “Administrative Office Assignment”) or (ii) an administrative assignment within his or her school with a program consisting of Professional or Administrative Activities (as listed in CBA Articles 7(A)(6)(a), 7(B)(8)(a), 7(C)(4)(g)(1), or 7(K)(3)(d)) other than items #1 (small group instruction), #2 (one to one tutoring), #3 (advise student activities such as clubs, teams or publications) and #7 (conflict resolution for students), which shall be scheduled consistent with CBA Article 7(B)(2)(c) regardless of the division in which the employee works (“Administrative School Assignment”).  Where the Chancellor or his designee determines that it is in the best interests of the school system that an employee accused of sexual misconduct as defined in CBA Article 21(G)(6) or serious financial misconduct involving more than $1,000 not be allowed to work in an Administrative Office Assignment or an Administrative School Assignment pending the outcome of the investigation, the DOE may suspend the employee with pay rather than reassign him/her.  The determination of the Chancellor or his designee to suspend an employee with pay shall be in writing.  Prior to a suspension from all duties with pay, the Chancellor or his designee shall consult with the UFT President or his designee. 
The DOE shall prefer charges pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a[1] within 60 days of an employee being reassigned or suspended, except in cases where the reassignment or suspension was caused by (i) an allegation of sexual misconduct as defined in CBA Article 21(G)(6) that is being investigated by the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District (“SCI”), (ii) an allegation of serious financial misconduct involving more than $1,000 that is being investigated by SCI, (iii) criminal charges pending against the employee, (iv) an allegation of serious assault that is being investigated by SCI, (v) an allegation of tampering with a witness or evidence, where the allegation of tampering is being investigated by SCI.  In cases where the 60 day period does not apply, when SCI issues a report or, in the case of criminal charges, the employee notifies the DOE of the disposition of the criminal case pursuant to Chancellor's Regulation C-105, the DOE shall have 15 days to bring § 3020-a charges against the employee or return the employee to his or her prior assignment.  Nothing herein shall waive any limitations period for the bringing of charges pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a.  The Chancellor or his designee and the President of the UFT or his designee shall meet monthly, or less frequently if the UFT and DOE agree, to review the status of these cases.   At the end of the first year of this Agreement, and in subsequent years if requested by the UFT, the DOE and the UFT will meet to review the issue of investigations and reassignments extending beyond 60 days and, if there has been a significant increase in the number of such investigations and reassignments, to negotiate ways to address this issue.
 
Except in those cases where the DOE is not required to prefer charges within 60 days, should the DOE not prefer § 3020-a charges within 60 days, the employee shall be returned to his/her prior assignment.  If an employee is returned to his/her prior assignment, adverse action shall not be taken against the employee solely because of the reassignment.  If § 3020-a charges are preferred subsequent to the expiration of the 60 day period, the employee may then again be reassigned to an Administrative Office Assignment or an Administrative School Assignment or, where the Chancellor or his designee determines that it is in the best interests of the school system that an employee accused of sexual misconduct as defined in CBA Article 21(G)(6) or serious financial misconduct involving more than $1,000 not be allowed to work in an Administrative Office Assignment or an Administrative School Assignment pending the outcome of the investigation, suspend the employee with pay rather than reassign him/her pending determination of the § 3020-a charges.  The determination of the Chancellor or his designee to suspend an employee with pay shall be in writing.  Prior to a suspension from all duties with pay, the Chancellor or his designee shall consult with the UFT President or his designee.   An employee’s assignment pending investigation and/or a hearing shall not be raised at the hearing or deemed relevant in any way to the determination of the charges, any penalty issued or the adjudication of any issue in the hearing. 

Incompetence Cases (i.e., any case deemed by the DOE to deal exclusively or primarily with an employee’s pedagogy) Pending the bringing of Education Law § 3020-a charges for alleged incompetence and completion of the § 3020-a hearing, the DOE may reassign an employee only to an (i) Administrative Office Assignment or (ii) an Administrative School Assignment.  The DOE shall prefer charges pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a within 10 days of an employee being reassigned.  Should the DOE not prefer § 3020-a charges within 10 days, the employee shall be returned to his/her prior assignment.  If an employee is returned to his/her prior assignment, adverse action shall not be taken against the employee solely because of the reassignment.  If § 3020-a charges are preferred subsequent to the expiration of the 10 day period, the employee may then again be reassigned to an Administrative Office Assignment or an Administrative School Assignment pending determination of the § 3020-a charges.     
  
Tolling:  If the DOE gives a reassigned employee 48 hours notice of an interview which may lead to disciplinary action and the reassigned employee either fails to appear on the scheduled day or fails to notify the DOE that s/he is invoking any right he/she may have to not answer questions, the DOE shall reschedule the interview within a reasonable period of time and the time between the originally scheduled interview and the rescheduled interview shall not count towards the applicable 60-day or 10-day limits on the length of time an employee may be reassigned or suspended with pay.  Where a principal schedules an interview which may lead to disciplinary action of an employee that has been given an Administrative School Assignment and 48 hours notice is not required by the CBA, Chancellor’s regulations, or law, the following shall apply:  If the reassigned employee either fails to appear on the scheduled day or fails to notify the principal that s/he is invoking any right he/she may have to not answer questions, the principal shall reschedule the interview within a reasonable period of time and the time between the first scheduled interview and the rescheduled interview shall not count towards the applicable 60-day or 10-day limits on the length of time an employee may be reassigned.  Nothing herein shall constitute a waiver or alteration of any right the DOE may have to compel an employee to attend an interview which may lead to disciplinary action or any right an employee may have to not answer questions.      

Service of Charges

In order to make the process as efficient as possible, service of notice of the nature of the charges and the actual charges shall be consolidated and served together upon an employee along with specifications and, in incompetence cases, a bill of particulars.  Nothing in this Agreement shall alter a Respondent’s entitlement, if any, to a bill of particulars in misconduct cases.    
Probable Cause Determinations

In addition to the enumerated acts set forth in CBA Article 21(G)(5), serious misconduct shall also include actions that would constitute a class A-I or A-II felony or any felony defined as a violent felony offense in NY Penal Law § 70.02.  An indictment on a class A-I or A-II felony, an indictment on any felony defined as a violent felony offense in NY Penal Law § 70.02, or a felony indictment on any other conduct that constitutes serious misconduct pursuant to CBA Article 21(G)(5) shall create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause.           

If a finding of probable cause was based on an indictment pursuant to CBA Article 21(G)(5), the employee shall remain off payroll pending the disposition of the criminal case.  The DOE shall have 15 days after the employee notifies the DOE of the disposition of the criminal case pursuant to Chancellor's Regulation C-105 to bring Education Law § 3020-a charges based on the same conduct as was at issue in the criminal case.  If the DOE prefers § 3020-a charges on the same conduct as was at issue in the criminal case within the 15 days, and the employee was convicted in the criminal case of any offense that constitutes serious misconduct, he/she shall remain off payroll until a decision in the § 3020-a case and such § 3020-a case shall be completed within the timeframes for hearings set forth in this Agreement.  If the DOE prefers § 3020-a charges on the same conduct as was at issue in the criminal case within the 15 days, and the employee was acquitted of all offenses that constitute serious misconduct, the DOE shall reassign the employee to an Administrative Office Assignment or an Administrative School Assignment, suspend the employee with pay (if permitted pursuant to this Agreement) or request a second probable cause hearing to continue the suspension without pay until the final outcome of the § 3020-a hearing and such § 3020-a case shall be completed within the timeframes for hearings set forth in this Agreement.  If the DOE does not bring Education Law § 3020-a charges within those 15 days, the employee shall be restored to the payroll effective as of the date the disposition of the criminal case and returned to his/her prior position.     

If a finding of probable cause was based on criminal charges pursuant to CBA Article 21(G)(6), the DOE shall have 15 days after the employee notifies the DOE of the disposition of the criminal charge pursuant to Chancellor's Regulation C-105 to bring Education Law § 3020-a charges based on the same conduct as was at issue in the criminal charge.  If the DOE brings such a § 3020-a charge, the employee shall remain off payroll until a decision in the § 3020-a case and such § 3020-a case shall be completed within the timeframes for hearings set forth in this Agreement.  If the DOE does not bring § 3020-a charges based on the same conduct as was at issue in the criminal charge within 15 days of the employee notifying the DOE of the disposition of the criminal charge pursuant to Chancellor's Regulation C-105, the employee
shall be restored to the payroll effective as of the date the disposition of the criminal charge. 

Nothing in this Agreement shall alter the provisions of CBA Article 21(G)(5) and (6) with respect to entitlement to back pay.    The DOE agrees to meet on a bimonthly basis with the UFT to assess the status of investigations extending beyond 60 days where the employee has been suspended without pay.    

Timeframe for Hearings

Within 10 - 15 days of DOE’s receipt of the request for a hearing from an employee charged under Education Law § 3020-a, a pre-hearing conference shall be held.  Both Education Law § 3020-a and the collective bargaining agreements require hearings, including closing statements, to be completed within sixty (60) days of the pre-hearing conference and a decision to be rendered within thirty (30) days of the final hearing date. The UFT and DOE agree this timeframe must be adhered to by all parties to the hearings and strictly enforced by hearing officers.  Hearing officers shall establish a trial schedule at the pre-hearing conference to ensure that hearings are completed within the required statutory and contractual timeframes and ensure an equitable distribution of days between the DOE and the charged employee. 
  
Education Law § 3020-a permits “limited extensions” beyond the 60 days where it is determined that “extraordinary circumstances” warrant.  “Extraordinary circumstances” shall be construed narrowly by hearing officers so that the granting of “limited extensions” allowing hearings to last beyond sixty (60) days is the exception and not the rule.  Pursuant to CBA Article 21, a hearing officer may be removed prior to the end of his or her one-year term only for good and sufficient cause, which may include failure to comply with this Agreement, upon mutual agreement of the UFT and DOE. 

If the hearing officer determines that a necessary witness is a former student who is unavailable because he/she is residing outside of New York City or a current student who is unavailable because he/she has left New York City for an extended period of time, this shall constitute an “extraordinary circumstance.”  In such a case, the hearing officer shall schedule the hearing to begin or continue as soon as possible given the availability of the witness as demonstrated to the hearing officer.       

Arbitrators serving on the competence panel must agree to provide seven (7) consecutive hearing dates as defined in CBA Article 21(G)(2)(a) per month for the months of September through June and two (2) hearing dates for the months of July and August.

Discovery and Testimony

In order to comply with timelines for hearings, the UFT and DOE agree that hearings must be held in as efficient a manner as possible.  Disputes relating to document production, witness lists and other procedural issues often consume hearing time and should be dealt with to the maximum extent possible in the pre-hearing conference.  To that end, the UFT and DOE have already agreed in the June 27, 2008 letter from the Chancellor to President of the UFT to certain discovery procedures. 

The hearing process itself can be conducted in a more efficient manner that allows for issues to be fully and fairly litigated.  To accomplish this, the parties to the hearings shall adhere to the following guidelines:

  • 1.      It is the intent of the UFT and DOE that, to the extent practicable, hearing days shall be fully utilized, that hearing days not end before 5pm and the parties to the hearing have multiple witnesses ready to testify to avoid the loss of part of the day. 
  • 2.      Where a hearing day is not fully used, the unused time will be counted towards the time allocated to the party that caused the delay. 
  • 3.      Attorneys shall not meet with others between direct and cross examination for longer than 20 minutes, except in unusual circumstances.
  • 4.      Hearing Officers shall ensure that cross-examination is not used by either party as a dilatory tactic in order to reduce one of the parties’ allotted time to present its case.
  • 5.      Evidence shall be limited to relevant matters.
  • 6.      Rebuttal shall be used only to deny some affirmative fact that the opposing party has tried to prove.  During rebuttal, a party to the hearing may not offer proof to corroborate evidence that has already been presented by that party or proof tending merely to support that party’s case after the opposing party has rested.     

If relevant and requested at the pre-hearing conference, either party may introduce (i) relevant background evidence about a witness by affidavit from the witness; (ii) an affidavit from a doctor’s office attesting to an employee’s visit or non-visit on a particular date; (iii) an affidavit attesting to the date of an employee’s arrest, the charge (if any) against the arrested employee, and the disposition of that charge.  Such a witness may be cross-examined regarding any matter discussed in an affidavit. 

If relevant, a (i) business record, (ii) attendance list from a faculty meeting, orientation and/or training session, or (iii) any human resource document submitted by a respondent (e.g., absence or sick note) may be admitted with an affidavit from a custodian of the record, without the need for live testimony from a witness to authenticate the document. 

A party to the hearing or the hearing officer may request an unedited copy of the relevant transcript if a certified transcript is not available when needed.  The unavailability of a certified transcript shall not excuse adherence to the time limitations for completion of a hearing and issuance of a decision.   

Non-Termination Cases

The expedited hearing process as described in CBA Article 21(G)(3) shall be utilized as set forth therein, with the following modification:  If the DOE decides not to seek a penalty of more than a suspension of 4 weeks or an equivalent fine, the case shall be heard under the expedited procedures provided in CBA Article 21(G)(3), without the need for the employee to accept an offer of expedited arbitration.

A separate track of “non-termination” cases will be established with a separate panel of additional hearing officers that exclusively hears expedited cases. 

Panel of Hearing Officers

The number of hearing officers shall be as follows:

            Incompetence Cases shall be heard by a panel of 14 hearing officers.

            Misconduct Cases shall be heard by a panel of 25 hearing officers.

            Expedited Cases shall be heard by a panel of hearing officers, the size of which will be set by the UFT and DOE as described below. 

Representatives of the UFT and DOE shall meet monthly, or less frequently if the UFT and DOE agree, for the first year of this Agreement and at least twice a year thereafter (i) to agree on the number of hearing officers hearing expedited cases, (ii) to discuss the appropriateness of the number of hearing officers, including the possibility of agreeing to increase or decrease the number of hearing officers on either the incompetence or misconduct panels on either a temporary or permanent basis, and (iii) to discuss the appropriateness of the number of probable cause arbitrators, including the possibility of agreeing to increase or decrease the number of probable cause arbitrators.  If the DOE believes there is a need for more hearing officers to comply with the timelines set forth in this Agreement, it shall request that the UFT agree to increase the number of hearing officers and the UFT shall not unreasonably deny an increase.  

Decisions

Both Education Law § 3020-a and the collective bargaining agreements require decisions within 30 days of the completion of the hearing.

Meeting with the Panel of Hearing Officers

The Chancellor and the President of the UFT will personally, jointly meet with the panel of hearing officers annually to impress upon the hearing officers that both parties to this Agreement are serious about meeting the timelines in the law, the collective bargaining agreements, and this Agreement.  The Chancellor and the President will urge the hearing officers to strictly control the hearings and require all parties to the hearing to conform to the timelines provided herein.  They will assure the hearing officers that no hearing officer will be removed by either party to this Agreement for enforcing these rules.

Mediation of Education Law § 3020-a charges

This section, “Mediation of Education Law § 3020-a charges,” shall apply to all employees with pending Education Law § 3020-a charges on or before September 1, 2010 or being investigated on or before September 1, 2010 and the investigation results in § 3020-a charges.  The parties to the § 3020-a hearings shall begin mediating such cases upon the signing of this Agreement.

The UFT and DOE shall agree on hearing officers on the rotational panel that shall serve as mediators one day per month (in addition to their required hearing days that month).  The UFT and DOE may also jointly select mediators not currently on the panel of hearing officers.   

Each case subject to mediation shall be assigned, on a rotational basis, to a mediator, other than the hearing officer assigned to decide the case.

The employee (and the employee’s representative, if any) and a representative of the DOE with authority to negotiate settlement agreements (subject to final supervisory approval) shall meet with the mediator.  The mediator shall work informally to assist the charged employee and the DOE in reaching, if possible, a voluntary, negotiated resolution of the Education Law § 3020-a charges.  The mediator shall not decide the merits of the Education Law § 3020-a charges or impose a decision.  Instead, the mediator shall help the charged employee and the DOE to, if possible, agree on a mutually acceptable resolution.      

No mediator shall be compelled to or voluntarily disclose (including in any subsequent proceedings under §3020-a of the Education Law) any information learned during the mediation.

Backlog
Effective the first day of the 2010-2011 school year, all employees who, prior to August 31, 2010, have been (i) removed from their positions and assigned to a temporary reassignment center or (ii) charged pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a shall be reassigned to an Administrative Office Assignment or an Administrative School Assignment or suspended with pay (if permitted by this Agreement).     

For all employees charged prior to August 31, 2010, the requirement that the pre-hearing conference be scheduled within 10-15 days of the charge shall not apply, but the § 3020-a hearing and decision shall be completed by December 31, 2010. 

For all employees who were assigned to a TRC prior to August 31, 2010 and were not charged prior to August 31, 2010, the 10 or 60 day period to charge an employee or return him/her to his/her prior assignment, shall run from September 1, 2010.
Effective September 1, 2010, the parties will implement the new timelines set forth in this Agreement, which shall apply to all cases charged after September 1, 2010. 

 Sincerely,
Joel I. Klein
Chancellor
New York City Department of Education
 Agreed and Accepted By:
_____________________
Michael Mulgrew
President
United Federation of Teachers

[1] Probationary employees will be reassigned in the same manner as tenured employees under this Agreement, i.e, to an Administrative Office Assignment, Administrative School Assignment, or suspension with pay (if permitted by this Agreement).  This Agreement shall not be construed to create tenure or Education Law § 3020-a rights for an employee.       

Tuesday, June 5, 2012

The Agreement That Wasnt: The 2008 ATR Agreement

  In an effort to make sense of what is now happening to good teachers ground up and spit out by the "Gotcha Squad" and 3020-a, I took a look back at the so-called "agreements" that the UFT and the DOE made since 2008. it's pretty shocking, when you realize that important rights were denied to so many good people, all with the consent of the UFT. Below is the 2008 ATR "Agreement" - remember that one?

UFT, DoE Agreement Addresses ATR Educator Issue, Saves Money For Schools


In an important agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the placement of growing numbers of New York City public school educators in the ATR pool, the UFT and the DoE have established a protocol to improve dramatically their placement in regular assignments. The agreement creates substantial financial incentives for schools to hire ATRs, replacing what were heavy budgetary disincentives.
The agreement was reached after the UFT responded to these growing numbers with a “Let Us Teach” campaign which profiled the committed, accomplished educators who wanted to teach and care for students, but were instead languishing in the ATR pool.
“This is a terrific agreement that benefits everyone,” said UFT President Randi Weingarten. “These experienced and qualified people have essentially seen their careers put in a holding pattern due to the downsizing or closing of schools. They have been struggling to find permanent jobs in large part because schools have been opting for less experienced personnel at lower salaries. By eliminating the financial obstacles that have prevented principals from hiring them, we should see more permanent placements, and that in turn should reduce the size of the ATR pool and save the school district money.”
Specifically, under the terms of the agreement the DoE will
  • urge school principals to hire ATR educators, and end the separation of ATRs in all job fairs/hiring halls;
  • subsidize schools that hire educators from the ATR pool the difference between a starting teacher’s salary and the cost of the ATR educator’s salary for eight years;
  • subsidize schools that hire educators from the ATR pool a lump sum equal to ½ of the salary of that educator;
  • allow schools to hire educators from the ATR pool for up to one year on a provisional basis, with the above subsidies kicking in if the school converts that hire to a permanent placement;
  • create a list of schools where ATR educators may be needed, based on factors such as school size and absences, to which educators in the ATR pool can apply for assignment.
Currently, schools are charged the full cost of the salary of all hires, and so have a substantial economic disincentive for hiring experienced, accomplished ATR educators over novice teachers. As well, the DoE has promoted the hiring of novice educators, often at the expense of experienced educators in the ATR pool.
Since this protocol is a ‘side agreement,’ it leaves intact all of the existing collective bargaining agreement — in this instance, the system of mutual consent by both school and teacher in hiring and placement, the job security for current UFT represented titles and the ability to arrange a retirement buy-out for educators in the ATR pool.
The UFT and the DoE have agreed to review this agreement in a year.

Absent Teacher Reserve and Vacancies Agreement, November 2008

Memorandum of Agreement entered into this _______day of November, 2008 by and between the New York City Board of Education (hereinafter "DOE") and the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (hereinafter the Union).
All terms and conditions of the current collective bargaining agreements between the parties remain in full force and effect. This side agreement assists in using talent and resources more effectively:
  1. In recognition of the realities of the evolving budget situation and a pool of available qualified, experienced teachers, the Chancellor will convey to principals that though they continue to have final say over teacher hiring decisions it is his clear preference that the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) pool be used as the first option in filling new and existing vacancies. Towards that end, the Chancellor will send a letter to principals strongly urging them to consider and interview members of the ATR pool to fill vacancies before considering other candidates, explaining the significant financial incentives created herein for them to do so, and underscoring that, as the city confronts the current fiscal crisis, responsible management principles require a commitment to actively and in good faith pursue hiring ATRs prior to filling open positions.
  2. The DOE will also send principals lists of ATRS and their license areas and district/superintendency.
  3. "ATR" refers to all UFT-represented titles.
  4. When a centrally-funded ATR is hired to fill a regular position in a school (other than the school from which the ATR was excessed), on or after November 1st of the calendar year in which they were excessed, central DOE will pay the difference between the actual salary of the teacher and a starting teacher salary, and then, in subsequent years, will continue to pay the difference between the actual salary and the subsequent steps on the salary scale (for example, in year 2, the difference between actual salary and step 2A on the salary scale). This subsidy will terminate once the excessed employee has been in the position 8 years.
  5. Until November 15, 2010 a school that hires a centrally-funded ATR to fill a regular position (other than a school from which the ATR was excessed) on or after November 1st of the calendar year in which they were excessed, in addition to being charged in accordance with ¶ 4 above, central DOE will credit the hiring school's budget one-half of the starting teacher salary that would otherwise be paid by the school under ¶4 above.
  6. After November 1, principals can offer to hire centrally-funded ATRs for the balance of the school year on a provisional basis whereby ATRs accepting this offer can be excessed, regardless of seniority, at the end of the school year in which they are hired, or can opt to be placed in excess again at that time. If the ATR is not excessed again at the end of the school year, and does not opt to be placed in excess at that time, the ATR will become a regularly-appointed pedagogue at the school. The subsidies provided for in ¶ 4 & ¶ 5 above will not apply to ATRs hired provisionally pursuant to this paragraph, but will apply should such an ATR become a regularly-appointed pedagogue at the school.
  7. There will be a city-wide posting consisting of all schools that have a high enough rate of absences to benefit from a full-time ATR and that do not have an ATR already assigned, or have enough students to warrant one or more additional ATR's. With principal approval of adding one or more ATRs, centrally-funded ATR's may apply to transfer into the district/superintendency and be placed in the selected school as an ATR up to a limit of one (1) ATR per 500 students, with city-wide seniority determining priority among multiple applicants.
  8. Excessed pedagogues will not be separated from other job applicants at job fairs, though they will be given the option to decline to attend briefing sessions for new teachers.
  9. ATR's will be used for classroom assignments, e.g. push-in, pull-out, intervention, remediation, to cover day-to-day and long-term teacher absences, to reduce class size, and other assignments within the teacher job description.
  10. DOE will make its best efforts to modify its systems so that, by school year 2009-2010, applicants for specific vacancies in the open market or the excess hiring system will be notified when their application is received, if they are hired and if the position has been filled with another applicant.
  11. It is the mutual objective of the DOE and UFT in reaching this side agreement to reduce the size of the excess pool by 1) eliminating any financial disincentives to fill open positions out of the ATR pool; 2) creating a financial incentive for the school to hire out of the ATR pool; and 3) improving processes and procedures that will facilitate the hiring process for ATRs. The UFT and the DOE will review the results of this side agreement after it has been in operation for one year and, on that basis, will work collaboratively to determine if it is necessary to find additional solutions aimed to reduce the size of the ATR pool in a manner that serves the best interests of the students of New York City public schools and reflects the need to address the fiscal challenges we face together.
  12. This agreement will expire on December 1, 2010 although paragraphs 4, 5 & 6 will continue to apply to hiring done on or prior to that date, according to the specific terms set forth above.
  13. The UFT will hold its arbitration (case number A-079-C16257) in abeyance to allow this agreement time to go into effect.
Agreed to this ______ of November, 2008.
For the Board of Education For the United Federation of Teachers