Betty Brumer, Appellant, v City of New York et al.,
Respondents, et al., Defendant. (Index No. 32716/09)
2014-00461
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
132 A.D.3d 795; 18 N.Y.S.3d 149; 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7683; 2015 NY Slip
Op 07611
October 21, 2015, Decided
CORE TERMS: teacher, special
relationship, summary judgment, school district, owe, inter alia, school
premises, administrators, municipality, supervising, adults, recover damages,
personal injuries, security guard
HEADNOTES
Schools—Teachers—Assault
by Student—Dismissal of Complaint for Failure to Show Special Relationship
between School District and Teacher
COUNSEL: [***1] Cronin & Byczek, LLP, Lake
Success, N.Y. (Linda M. Cronin of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y.
(Kristin M. Helmers, Margaret King, and Keegan K. Staker of counsel), for
respondents.
JUDGES: L. PRISCILLA
HALL, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX, JJ.
HALL, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and HINDS-RADIX, JJ., concur.
OPINION
[**149] [*795] In an action, inter
alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an
order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Landicino, J.), dated July 5, 2013,
which granted that branch of the motion of the defendants City of New York,
New York City Department of Education, principal Douglas Avila, and assistant
principal Joseph Simione which was for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that order
is affirmed, with costs.
[**150] The plaintiff, a
fourth grade teacher at a public school in Brooklyn, alleges that she was
injured when she was assaulted by one of her students. According to the
plaintiff, the student had been restrained by a school security guard after
engaging in a fight with another boy during a fire drill. Although the
security guard escorted [***2] the student away
from the rest of the [*796] class, the student
subsequently returned to the scene and began fighting again. The plaintiff
alleges that during this second episode, the student hit her, causing her to
fall to the ground and sustain injuries.
The plaintiff
commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries.
After depositions were conducted, the defendants City of New York, New York
City Department of Education, principal Douglas Avila, and assistant
principal Joseph Simione (hereinafter collectively the school defendants)
moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as
asserted against them, contending that there was no special relationship
between them and the plaintiff, and, as such, that they did not owe her a
duty of care. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the school defendants'
motion.
A school district
may not be held liable for the negligent performance of its governmental
function of supervising children in its charge, at least in the absence of a
special duty to the person injured (see Dinardo v
City of New York, 13 NY3d 872, 874, 921 NE2d 585, 893
NYS2d 818 [2009]; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d 849, 988 NYS2d 207 [2014]; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d 847, 847-848, 877 NYS2d 400 [2009]; Moreno v City of New York, 27 AD3d 536, 536-537, 813 NYS2d 143 [2006]).
Although a school district owes a special duty to its minor students, that
duty does not extend to teachers, administrators, [***3] or other adults on
or off school premises (see Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Stinson
v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d at 847-848).
With regard to
teachers, administrators, or other adults on or off school premises, a
special relationship with a municipal defendant can be formed in three ways:
" '(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the
benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a
duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the
duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in
the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation' " (Thomas v New York City Dept. of
Educ., 124 AD3d 762, 763, 2 NYS3d 178
[2015], quoting Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186, 199-200, 810 NE2d 393, 778 NYS2d 111
[2004]).
Here, as the
Supreme Court correctly concluded, the school defendants established, prima
facie, that they did not owe the plaintiff a special duty (see Thomas v New York City Dept. of
Educ., 124 [*797] AD3d at 763; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d at 847-848). The plaintiff, in
opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact in this regard (see Thomas v New York City Dept. of
Educ., 124 AD3d at 763; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Moreno v City of New York, 27 AD3d at 536-537). As no special duty
existed, we need not consider whether, in supervising the students, the
school defendants were performing a discretionary function which would avail
them of the governmental immunity defense (see Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69, 75-76, 960 NE2d 356, 936 NYS2d 587 [2011]; Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d at [**151]
874; Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850).
Accordingly, the
Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the school defendants' motion
which was for summary judgment dismissing [***4] the complaint
insofar as asserted against them (see Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Moreno v City of New York, 27 AD3d at 536-537). Hall, J.P., Austin,
Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
and,
Guerrieri v New York City
Dept./Bd. of Educ.
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2015 NY Slip Op 07816 [132 AD3d
949]
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October 28, 2015
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Appellate Division, Second
Department
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As corrected through Wednesday,
December 9, 2015
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Thomas Guerrieri et al.,
Appellants,
v
New York City Department/Board of Education, Respondent, et al., Defendants.
(And a Third-Party Action.)
|
Gardiner & Nolan, Brooklyn, N.Y. (William Gardiner of
counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M.
Helmers, Nicholas J. Murgolo, and Damian S. Todola of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the
plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta,
J.), dated August 16, 2013, which granted the motion of the defendant New York
City Department/Board of Education for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff Thomas Guerrieri (hereinafter the injured plaintiff)
was employed as a school bus driver by an independent contractor that
contracted with the New York City Department/Board of Education (hereinafter
the defendant) to provide transportation services to the defendant's students.
In 2002 the injured plaintiff allegedly was assaulted by one of the defendant's
students while he was transporting that student. The injured plaintiff, and his
wife suing derivatively, commenced this action against, among others, the
defendant. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and the
plaintiffs appeal.
"Liability for a claim that a municipality negligently exercised
a governmental function 'turns upon the existence of a special duty to the
injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public' " (Coleson v
City of New York,
24 NY3d 476, 481 [2014], quoting Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58 NY2d 253, 261 [1983]). While a school
district owes a special duty to its students to adequately supervise them to
prevent foreseeable injuries to fellow students, that duty does not extend to
adults (see
Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d 849, 850 [2014]; Stinson v
Roosevelt U.F.S.D.,
61 AD3d 847 [2009]). Here, the
defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law by establishing that it did not owe the injured plaintiff a special duty (see
Ferguson v City of New York, 118 AD3d at 850; Stinson v Roosevelt U.F.S.D., 61 AD3d at 847; Goga v Binghamton City School Dist., 302 AD2d 650, 651 [2003]; Reynolds v Central Islip Union Free School Dist., 300 AD2d 292, 293 [2002]). In opposition, the
plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing
the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal
and Dickerson, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History:
2013 NY Slip Op 32097(U).]
ZELINDA ANTOINETTE DINARDO, Respondent, v CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant, THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.
No. 158
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
13 N.Y.3d 872; 921 N.E.2d 585; 893 N.Y.S.2d 818; 2009 N.Y. LEXIS 4144; 2009
NY Slip Op 8853
October 15, 2009, Argued
December 1, 2009, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from an order of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered December 23, 2008.
The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, (1) affirmed an amended
judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Norma Ruiz, J.), which, after a
jury trial, had dismissed the action against defendant City of New York (it
having been voluntarily discontinued by plaintiff during trial) and awarded
plaintiff damages against defendant Board of Education in the amount of $
512,465, and (2) dismissed an appeal from the original judgment of that
court, as superseded by the appeal from the amended judgment.
Dinardo v. City of New York, 57 AD3d 373, 871 NYS2d 15, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS
9795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't, 2008), reversed.
DISPOSITION: Order reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed, in a
memorandum.
CORE
TERMS: special
relationship, discretionary, municipality, assurance, supervisor, classroom,
matter of law, injured party's, special relationship, justifiable reliance,
ministerial, municipal, discretionary acts, justifiably relied, false sense
of security, happening, ongoing, induced, teacher, hang, duty to act,
immunity rule, tort liability, entitled to judgment, government action,
police officer, police protection, reasoned judgment, vigilance, favorable
HEADNOTES
Municipal Corporations -- Tort Liability
Defendant
Board of Education was entitled to judgment as a matter of law in an action
by plaintiff teacher who was injured when she tried to restrain a student,
who had been verbally and physically aggressive for several months, from
attacking another. In negligence cases premised on a special relationship
between a municipality and a plaintiff, the injured party's reliance is
critical as is the municipality's voluntary affirmative understanding of a
duty to act. There was no rational process by which the jury could have
reached a finding that plaintiff justifiably relied on assurances by the
Board. Vaguely worded statements by plaintiff's supervisor and principal that
"something" was being done to have the student removed, without any
indication of when, or if, such relief would come, did not, as a matter of
law, constitute an action that would lull a plaintiff into a false sense of
security or otherwise generate justifiable reliance. Plaintiff was aware that
the administrative process for determining whether a student should transfer
to a different program or school could take up to 60 days and was still
ongoing when the incident occurred.
COUNSEL: Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York
City (Marta Ross and Edward F.X. Hart of counsel), for appellant.
Clark, Gagliardi & Miller,
P.C., White
Plains (Henry G. Miller and John S. Rand of counsel), for respondent.
JUDGES: Judges
Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur. Chief Judge Lippman concurs in
result in an opinion. Judge Ciparick concurs in result.
OPINION
[**586] [***819] [*873] MEMORANDUM.
The
order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the
complaint dismissed.
Plaintiff
Zelinda Dinardo, a special education teacher at a New York City public
school, was injured when she tried to restrain one student from attacking
another. The student had been verbally and physically aggressive for several
months, and plaintiff had repeatedly expressed concerns to her supervisors
about her safety in the classroom. The school's supervisor of special
education and the principal had both told her that "things were being
worked on, things were happening" and urged her to "hang in there
because something was being done" to have the student removed. Following
her injury, plaintiff commenced this action alleging, among other things,
that by these assurances the Board of Education of the City of New York had
assumed an affirmative duty to take action with respect to the removal of the
student and that
she justifiably relied upon those assurances. When the student was not
removed in a timely fashion, plaintiff alleges, the altercation which led to
her injury resulted.
At
trial, at the close of plaintiff's proof, the Board of Education moved for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR
4401. Following a jury verdict in Dinardo's favor, the Board of
Education moved to set aside the verdict under CPLR
4404 (a). [*874] Supreme
Court denied both motions. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's
judgment awarding Dinardo damages. Two Justices dissented on a question of
law, and the Board of Education appeals as of right under CPLR
5601 (a).
The
Board of Education now argues that the conduct alleged to have constituted a
promise to act on her behalf was discretionary government action, which
cannot be a basis for liability (see McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 202-203, 905
NE2d 1167, 878 NYS2d 238 [2009]; Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 40-41, 459 NE2d
182, 471 NYS2d 73 [1983]). We have no occasion to decide that
question because, even assuming the school officials' actions in this case
were ministerial, there is no rational process by which a jury could have
found liability. [***820] [**587]
In
negligence cases premised on a special relationship between municipality and plaintiff,
"the
injured party's reliance is as critical . . . as is the municipality's
voluntary affirmative undertaking of a duty to act. . . . Indeed, at the
heart of most of these 'special duty' cases is the unfairness that the courts
have perceived in precluding recovery when a municipality's voluntary
undertaking has lulled the injured party into a false sense of security and
has thereby induced [her] either to relax [her] own vigilance or to forego
other available avenues of protection" (Cuffy v New York,
69 NY2d 255, 261, 505 NE2d 937, 513 NYS2d 372 [1987]).
The
assurance by the municipal defendant must be definite enough to generate
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff.
Affording
Dinardo every inference that may properly be drawn from the evidence
presented and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to her (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556, 686 NE2d
1346, 664 NYS2d 252 [1997]), we conclude that there is no rational
process by which the jury could have reached a finding that plaintiff
justifiably relied on assurances by the Board of Education. The vaguely
worded statements by Dinardo's supervisor and principal that
"something" was being done to have the student removed, without any
indication of
when, or if, such relief would come, do not, as a matter of law, constitute
an action that would lull a plaintiff into a false sense of security or
otherwise generate justifiable reliance. Indeed, plaintiff was aware that the
administrative process for determining whether a student should transfer to a
different program or school could take up to 60 days and was still ongoing
when the incident occurred. There was therefore no "special relationship"
between [*875] the
Board of Education and plaintiff (see Cuffy, 69 NY2d at 259),
upon which a cause of action for negligence could be based, and the Board of
Education is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCUR BY: LIPPMAN
CONCUR
Chief
Judge LIPPMAN. (concurring). I disagree with the majority's conclusion that a
rational jury could not have found that a special relationship existed
between plaintiff and defendant Board. For several months prior to the
incident giving rise to this action, the student exhibited increasing
behavioral problems, including bringing a knife to school, which resulted in
a week's suspension. Concerned about the student's behavior and the classroom
safety risks it presented, plaintiff and her supervisor submitted to the
Board's Committee on
Special Education a written recommendation to remove the student from
plaintiff's classroom and place him in a learning environment better equipped
to his highly problematic conduct. The recommendation was supported by notes
that plaintiff had kept regarding the student's behavior. These notes disclose
that the subject student frequently punched, kicked and threw various items
at his classmates. He also threatened to kill plaintiff, another teacher, and
his fellow classmates on numerous occasions.
While
the transfer request was pending, plaintiff repeatedly told her supervisors
that she was concerned about the safety of her classroom and "didn't
know how much longer [she could] hang in there." She testified, "it
was getting more and more impossible to conduct the class . . . I wanted to
quit. I couldn't go on anymore . . . It was getting unsafe, and I was
concerned about safety in the classroom, and . . . I did not want to
return." In response, her supervisors told her to "hang in
there" [***821] [**588] because
"something was being done" and "things were happening."
Viewing
the evidence, as we must at this juncture, in the light most favorable to
plaintiff (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556, 686 NE2d
1346, 664 NYS2d 252 [1997]), I think
the jury could have rationally concluded that a special relationship existed
between the plaintiff and defendant Board. Although the transfer request was
still outstanding when plaintiff was injured, the supervisors' repeated
assurances that "things were happening" and "something was
being done" suggested an impending solution to the dangerous situation.
It would not be unreasonable for the jury to infer that plaintiff, in
justifiable reliance on these assurances, chose to remain in the classroom
and continue teaching rather than quitting as she had threatened. It should
be stressed that the [*876] stark
choice facing plaintiff was whether she should resign and abandon her class
or continue to teach in a situation which was by any reasonable measure
dangerous. In electing to follow the latter, socially desirable course,
plaintiff relied upon the municipality's assurances that the situation would
soon be rectified. Indeed, the evidence, properly viewed, practically compels
the conclusion that the assurances made to plaintiff induced her to
"relax [her] own vigilance or . . . forego other available avenues of
protection" (Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 261, 505 NE2d
937, 513 NYS2d 372 [1987]), and thus sufficed to establish the special relationship upon which
recovery is conditioned.
Nevertheless,
I concur in the majority's result on constraint of McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194, 905 NE2d 1167, 878 NYS2d 238 [2009]).
In McLean, this
Court held that government action, if discretionary, may never form the basis
for tort liability, even if a special relationship exists between the
plaintiff and the municipality. According to McLean, the special
relationship exception only applies where the challenged municipal action is
ministerial (see id. at 203). In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Tango v Tulevech (61 NY2d 34, 40, 459 NE2d 182, 471 NYS2d 73 [1983]) and Lauer v City of New York (95 NY2d 95, 99-100, 733 NE2d 184, 711 NYS2d 112 [2000]).
But, in those cases, the Court never expressly considered whether the special
relationship exception applied to discretionary governmental acts. Even if Tango and Lauer can arguably be read to
imply that the special relationship exception does not apply to discretionary
acts, that interpretation was flatly rejected in Pelaez v Seide (2 NY3d 186, 810 NE2d 393, 778 NYS2d 111 [2004]),
decided after Tango and Lauer, but prior to McLean. In Pelaez, this Court explicitly held
that a "narrow exception" to the general discretionary immunity
rule exists when a
plaintiff establishes a special relationship with the municipality (2 NY3d
at 193). One year later, in Kovit
v Estate of Hallums, we recognized that the police officer was exercising his
discretion and that in order "[t]o hold the City liable for the
negligent performance of a discretionary act, a plaintiff must establish a
special relationship with the municipality" (4
NY3d 499, 506, 829 NE2d 1188, 797 NYS2d 20 [2005]). I can discern
no convincing rationale for the Court's disregard of this relevant binding
precedent, which so unreasonably narrows--indeed effectively eliminates--the
special relationship exception.
Although
I agree that liability should not generally attach when a municipal employee
is exercising his or her reasoned judgment, the broad immunity recognized for
discretionary acts should not extend to situations where a special
relationship is [*877] [***822] [**589] present. The touchstone of the special duty
rule is that the government, by its undertaking to the specific plaintiff,
has gone above and beyond the general duty it owes to the public and created
a unique relationship with that plaintiff, upon which he or she is entitled
to rely. This is entirely consistent with the general tort principle that a
defendant should
be held liable for the breach of a duty it voluntarily assumed (see Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co., 247 NY 160, 167, 159 NE
896 [1928]).
Whether
the municipality's act is characterized as ministerial or discretionary
should not be, and never has been, determinative in special duty cases.
Indeed, in Cuffy, a
seminal case in the special duty context, the plaintiffs alleged that the
police had a special duty to protect them based on a police officer's promise
that an arrest would be made or some other protective action would be taken
regarding an ongoing dispute between plaintiffs and their neighbors (69
NY2d at 259). Although noting that the provision of police protection
is within the reasoned judgment of officials and therefore necessarily
discretionary in nature, we recognized that an exception to the discretionary
immunity rule exists when a special relationship exists between the
municipality and plaintiff (see id. at 260; see also Kircher v City of Jamestown, 74 NY2d 251, 255-256, 543
NE2d 443, 544 NYS2d 995 [1989]; De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 305, 457 NE2d
717, 469 NYS2d 611 [1983]). Unfortunately, under the rule
announced in McLean, a
plaintiff will never be able to recover for the failure to provide adequate
police protection, even
when the police voluntarily and affirmatively promised to act on that
specific plaintiff's behalf and he or she justifiably relied on that promise
to his or her detriment. This is particularly disturbing given our
recognition that the "police cases . . . all but occupy the special
relationship field" (Pelaez, 2 NY3d at 205).
The
rule in McLean, which
clearly extends beyond police protection and applies to all discretionary
governmental actions, allows public officials to unjustifiably hide behind
the shield of discretionary immunity even when their actions have induced a
plaintiff to change his or her behavior in the face of a known threat.
Because almost any governmental act may be characterized as discretionary (see Tango, 61 NY2d at 41,
citing Prosser, Torts § 132, at 990 [4th ed]), McLean too broadly insulates
government agencies from being held accountable to injured parties.
The
determination here as to whether and when to transfer a potentially dangerous
student is undoubtedly within the discretion of the Board and thus may not
subject the Board to [*878] liability
given the recent holding in McLean.
Accordingly, I reluctantly concur with the majority that the order of the
Appellate Division
should be reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Judges
GRAFFEO, READ, SMITH, PIGOTT and JONES concur in memorandum; Chief Judge
LIPPMAN concurs in result in an opinion; Judge CIPARICK concurs in result,
stating: The majority does not decide whether this is ministerial or
discretionary. I think it was discretionary and therefore, under our recent
decision in McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194, 905 NE2d 1167, 878 NYS2d 238 [2009]),
must concur, but if I were to go to the issue of special relationship, as the
majority does, I would [***823] [**590] disagree
for the reasons stated in the concurrence of the Chief Judge.
Order
reversed, etc.
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60 N.Y.2d 861 (1983)
Peter Vitale, Respondent,
v.
City of New York et al., Appellants.
Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
Argued October 17, 1983.
Decided November 22, 1983.
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel (Michael Gage and Leonard Koerner of counsel), for appellants.
Anthony J. Pirrotti for respondent.
Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JASEN, JONES, WACHTLER, MEYER, SIMONS and KAYE concur in memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the action dismissed.
Plaintiff, an industrial arts teacher at a junior high school, was injured when he was assaulted by one of the students as he sought to break up an altercation in the hallway of the school. Asserted liability of the city was predicated on evidence of unjustified failure fully to have observed a detailed security plan promulgated by the board of education pursuant to section 2801 of the Education Law. [*] This plan was designed to maintain public order on 863*863 school property, and among its beneficiaries were students, teachers, staff members, visitors and other licensees and invitees alike.
Plaintiff recognizes, as he must, that absent a special duty owed to him liability for his injuries may not be imposed on the city for its breach of a duty owed generally to persons in the school system and members of the public ( Glick v City of New York, 53 AD2d 528, affd 42 N.Y.2d 831; Bass v City of New York, 38 AD2d 407, affd 32 N.Y.2d 894; Riss v City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579). It is his contention, however, that a special relationship was created between him and the board of education when the security plan was adopted and that the board breached its special duty of care to him when it failed to enforce its own security rules. He grounds his assertion of special duty, and seeks to distinguish the holding in the Glick case, on the circumstance that as a teacher he was himself an integral component of that plan. Nothing in the adoption or content of the plan warrants a finding that it was designed or intended specially for his benefit or that of other teachers in the school. They stood as its beneficiaries in exactly the same position as students, other personnel in the school system, and members of the public who came on the school property. We reject his contention that because the teachers had a role to play in the implementation of the plan they were somehow thereby converted into its special beneficiaries. Indeed other than reciting the bare fact that as a teacher plaintiff had responsibilities for implementation of the plan, he advances no rationale as to why that fact without more should give rise to the special duty which is a condition precedent to governmental liability.
Order reversed, etc.
[*] That section provides:
"Regulation by boards of education of conduct on school district property
"1. The board of education, as defined in section two of this chapter, of every school district, however created, within the state shall adopt rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order on school property and shall provide a program for the enforcement thereof. Such rules and regulations shall govern the conduct of students, teachers and other staff as well as visitors and other licensees and invitees. The penalties for violations of such rules and regulations shall be clearly set forth therein and shall include provisions for the ejection of a violator from the school property and in the case of a student or teacher, his suspension, expulsion or other appropriate disciplinary actions. Such rules and regulations shall be filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ninety days after the effective date of this act. All amendments to such rules and regulations shall be filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ten days after their adoption.
"2. If the board of education fails to file the rules and regulations within the time required by this section such school district may not be eligible to receive any state aid or assistance until such rules and regulations are duly filed.
"3. Nothing contained in this section is intended nor shall it be construed to limit or restrict the freedom of speech nor peaceful assembly."
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